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A year has passed since the whole world has been affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, a completely 
unexpected event that demonstrates the interdependence of the human society – showing no one 
invulnerable to the spread of the virus. The health crisis rapidly turned into an economic and social 
crisis, making necessary a timely intervention from the governments. Intervention that, considering 
the non-linear behaviour of the shock – with outputs highly disproportionated to the known inputs 
-, demands for a huge deployment of resources. Over time, the rapid and widespread evolution of 
the outbreak has created the further requirement of structural policies, trying to “transform 
disruption into construction”, as Mario Monti said at the end of November 2020.  
Amongst the growing academic research about the pandemic and its relative consequences, my 
dissertation will seek to analyse the response to the adoption of the Guarantee Fund for SMEs by 
the Italian private eligible companies. The choice of the topic is driven by a personal curiosity 
about understanding what the real use of public resources has been and by the highly up to date 
nature of the topic. To draw a significant layout, the essay will be structured in four chapters.  
 
The first chapter starts from the 30th of January 2020, the day it was declared Covid-19 as a “Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern”, to describe how governments have dealt with the 
emergency. In particular, the main institutional measures in support of the companies enacted 
during the period from March to November 2020 in Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom have been presented. It is worth mentioning that, for the first time since 2009, a 
generalized improvement in the access to public financial support was registered: from -3% to 
+14% (European Central Bank, 2009), showing that the government initiatives have fed through 
the enterprises at European level. In the context of the economic slowdown, it became crucial trying 
to commit as much effort to prevent the effects on the real economy from being transferred to the 
credit sector, to avoid a spiral likely to have further negative impacts on households, businesses, 
and local authorities. Therefore, several public measures have been implemented to provide 
liquidity at subsidized conditions for postponing and smoothing the impact of the Covid-19 crisis 
(Gobbi, et al., 2020). Specifically, for what concerns the Italian scenario, a budget of more than 
€750 billion has been allocated through the Liquidity Decree in the moratorium on loans and 




Scheme managed by SACE. Furthermore, by the Relaunch Decree additional €12 billion of 
liquidity have been allocated to Italian regions and local authorities.   
 
Keynes (1936) identified the most urgent liquidity needs whenever a mismatch between costs and 
receipt of sale proceeds happens, reflecting exactly one of the main effects of the Covid-19 
outbreak. The second chapter outlines the crucial role of Public Credit Guarantees in addressing 
the emerging liquidity requirements of the companies, in particular the near-term liquidity needs – 
as advocated by the International Monetary Fund (Brault and Signore, 2020). This type of 
intervention was established by all the countries considered and, as the academic literature 
suggests, it represents a prompt measure to support the access to bank credit thanks to the provision 
of publicly funded collaterals (De Blasio, et al., 2018). The Italian Government deployed 22% of 
GDP (Camera dei Deputati, 2020) for this measure, during the entire year. Furthermore, even not 
in crisis times, the mentioned Scheme represents an incredible instrument able to grant additionality 
to those benefiting from it. Financial additionality whether the company has become able to collect 
loans that would not have occurred without the Scheme, or economic additionality if the economic 
actor has experienced an improvement in performance. 
 
Thereafter, in the third chapter, the State-backed Guarantee Fund for SMEs applying in Italy has 
been explained through the several amendments enacted as response to the downturn. Indeed, the 
provision has been significantly enhanced: the maximum loan amount granted has been doubled to 
five million euro per economic agent, the eligibility criteria have been expanded to include third-
sector entities, assurance agents and sub-agents, professionals, and companies with up to 499 
employees, moreover the full coverage rate has been favoured to loans up to €30,000. These 
remarkably favourable conditions resulted in five times as many procedures being activated by the 
Guarantee Fund for SMEs compared to the previous year, 2019. Furthermore, the allocation of the 
financing granted by the Guarantee Fund has been described, in terms of economic sectors and 
geographic areas differentiation, and also with reference to the time distribution. In fact, due to the 
many changes applied, the effective operativity of the Fund has been achieved from May.  
 
Afterward, in the fourth chapter, the factors which determined the companies’ choice in responding 
to the adoption of this Public Program have been analysed. Which company-specific variables 




or sector effect, with the aim of understanding whether it is possible to outline a common pattern 
of guarantee allocation among private Italian companies. Moreover, it has been analysed whether 
having benefited from a public guarantee during the previous financial year or participation in the 
Redundancy Scheme may have influenced the demand. Finally, the differentiation of the 
characteristics of the enterprises that requested a partial or total guarantee was described, as well 
as the amount of financing requested diversified according to the latter. And, once again, whether 
it is possible to trace some sort of geographical or industrial effect or whether the amount is entirely 











The institutional framework implemented in response to the Covid-19 crisis  
 
1. A general overview about the spread of the virus   
From the first quarter of the year, the entire world has been hit by the virus of Covid-19 which has 
completely transformed the worldwide scenario. On the 30th of January 2020, following the 
recommendations of the Emergency Committee, the World Health Organization declared the 
Covid-19 outbreak as a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern”. Then, the health 
crisis has quickly become an economic and social emergency with effects on every kind of 
business, individual, and institution. Therefore, testing the grade of resilience to adverse shocks of 
any economic agent and citizen, and nowadays it is still testing it.  
Without questioning the seriousness of the situation, it is interesting to have a comparison with the 
last well-known pandemic: the Spanish flu. During the 1918 flu pandemic, about 500 million 
people fell victim, and one-fifth of those died. At the time, the world population accounted for less 
than 2 billion people, so the worldwide incidence rate was more than 25%. As of December, the 
2nd, the cases of Covid-19 recorded all over the world were 63,995,700, with 1,483,227 deaths 
(Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, 2020). The current world population corresponds 
approximately to 7.7 billion (United States Census Bureau, 2020), and to this extent, 0.83% is the 
portion of the population hit by the SARS-CoV-2 to date. Since the Spanish flu health crisis, the 
global scene has changed completely but some of the containment measures put in place at that 
time correspond to those implemented today. Bans on social gatherings, widespread closures, 
isolation to limit the diffusion, and measures to support the effort of the healthcare system. In a 
very short period, the Coronavirus outbreak has affected the worldwide production, investment, 
and consumption levels utterly. The high uncertainty characterizing the international scenario 
brought to weak confidence in the markets, share prices losing value, decreases in the employment 
rate, drop in the foreign demand, a cut in the customer purchase power, and the unavoidable 
identification of all the already existent market failures, more evident during downturns (OECD, 
December 2020). All these inevitable consequences have caused the crisis to shape a new playing 
field. In quantitative terms, what have been the main worldwide effects, and what are the estimates 
formulated for the near future? The World Economic Outlook Report published in October 2020 




faster than expected – the worldwide rise to pre Covid-19 levels of activity has remained prone to 
setbacks. Nevertheless, the global growth is projected at - 4.4% during the whole year of 2020, due 
to the – better than anticipated – development of GDP during the second and third quarters. The 
global growth for 2021 is estimated at +5.2%, as a result of the more moderate downturn estimated 
for 2020 and of the persistent government measures. After the rebound in 2021, global growth is 
expected to gradually slow down to +3.5% into the medium term, demonstrating progress in 
moving towards the trend for 2020-2025, forecasted before the advent of the pandemic. Keeping a 
global perspective, there have been few negative consequences, but what should concern us most 
is the improvement of living standards. Indeed, the pandemic has reversed the progress in reducing 
world poverty and inequality levels (International Monetary Fund, October 2020).  
From a European perspective, several factors have interacted in determining the new playing field: 
interconnected production chains being transformed, government containment policies in relation 
to those implemented by the European institutions, and the degree of market competition 
threatened, depending on the different lockdown measures implemented. Also to be considered are 
changes in household consumption patterns, general behavioural adjustment actions, and 
implications for the European financial market. During the first semester, the economic activity 
has suffered a severe shock, then rebounded during the third quarter, concurrently with the release 
of some containment measures (Camera dei deputati, December 2020 ). The European Commission 
forecasted a contraction of - 7.4% in 2020, then followed by a positive trend of + 4.1% and + 3.0% 
respectively for the 2021 and the 2022. For both the Euro Area and Europe, a recovery to the pre-
pandemic levels of activity is not expected in 2022. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that impacts 
differ widely across the European States: the spread of the virus, the efficacy of national policy 
measures, the structure and functioning of the national healthcare systems, and the sectoral 
configuration of national economies must be considered to have a more specific framework 
(European Commission, November 2020).  
 
The focus of the outlook is now shifted to the first European country hit by Covid-19, Italy, since 
the dissertation will sharpen its topic on this country. On the 8th of December, Italy counted a total 
of 1,737,249 cases – 711,590 in the last thirty days (Istituto Superiore di Sanità, December 2020), 
in line with Spain, which counted a similar number of cases. Conversely, a lower number, around 
1.2 million cases, characterized Germany, while France by a strong absolute incidence of about 




lockdowns and extended uncertainty are still damaging activities, halting some sectors and severely 
disrupting others, although government measures are mitigating the effects with huge packages of 
resources. The rise in infections and the consequent tightening of containment measures have 
brought the dynamics of Italian industrial production back to the downward territory during the 
fourth quarter. For the latter, during the month of October, a rise of + 1.2% - when compared to 
September – was measured, while in November a loss of - 2.3% was registered due to the demand 
contraction caused by the restrictions re-introduced in Italy and in its main trade partners (Censis 
& Confimprese , October 2020). The annual volume of orders in November, compared to the month 
of January, decreased by approximately 6.3%, according to the National Institute of Statistics. In 
November 2020, both the consumer confidence index and business confidence index fell, the 
worsening was widespread due to issues in supply chain management, in the drop of retail trade’s 
expectations on future sales, and for the relevant decline in the traditional distribution for large-
scale distribution. Lastly, in terms of GDP variation, during 2020 a drop of - 8.9% is estimated, 
then followed by a slight forecasted recovery of +4.0% in 2021 (Istat, 2020). Both the European 
Commission and the International Monetary Fund predict a worse decline: - 9.9% and - 10.6% 
respectively, whereas in terms of the 2021 recovery, forecasts are quite aligned (Camera dei 
Deputati, December 2020). Italy had the second-worst recession in all the European Union, just 
after Spain. The forecasts for 2020 and 2021 are mainly determined by the domestic demand – net 
of stocks and the foreign demand: dropped by -7.5% and -1.2% respectively in 2020, which will 
recover by + 3.8% and + 0.3% in 2021. Italy is now dealing with the second strong wave of spread 
and all the new public measures that follow. For the first wave, policies were more weighted to 
balance the protection of citizens’ health and, in the meantime, the protection of economic 
activities. It has been estimated that the second wave of restrictions, added to the first one, would 
probably cost an annual collapse of €229 billion (-19.5%) to the level of consumption and a 
potential cut of 5 million jobs (Censis and Confimprese, October 2020). As demonstrated by these 
few data alone, the extraordinary nature of the event and the unpredictable trend of the health crisis 
has made it, and it is still determining the next normal truly challenging.  
 
2. How Governments have dealt with the emergency  
Given the new international scenario, all the States were called to put their strengths and operational 




variables: a supply shock due to the disruption in supply chains and the relative difficulties in the 
provisions of raw materials, a demand shock both from a foreign and a domestic point of view, 
caused by lower consumer demand, potential difficulty at logistics or infrastructural levels, the 
labour market massively impacted and lastly, the inevitable negative effects on the investment 
plans and liquidity levels, both for companies and households (Camera dei Deputati, December 
2020). The Governments had to decide quickly what to do, how, and through what type of 
resources. According to the International Monetary Fund, by mid-April the G20 countries had 
already announced direct measures amounting for 3.5% of their GDP, by that time similar to the 
amount allocated in response to the Global Financial Crisis (Banca d'Italia, May 2020). Therefore, 
the Governments confirmed their unquestionable ability of intervention. Concerning this, Giovanni 
Tria (2020), former Italian Minister of Economy and Finance, highlights three important issues that 
could arise during periods of crisis, with regards to the public role. Firstly, whether the State must 
enter the production system overtaking the unique supply of essential public goods and services or 
just offering a protection and support system. Secondly, the necessity of safeguarding the 
infrastructure needed for a competitive economy and guaranteeing the public investment capacity. 
And finally, the awareness that public pandemic deficits cannot be transformed into expenditure 
structural deficits. Therefore, the implementation of effective and well-balanced public policies 
became the priority for all the countries to reduce the contagion and strengthen the capacity to cope 
with the emergency. The responses implemented were characterized by similar patterns, divided 
into common macro-areas as labour market, equity replenishments, one-off revenues, debt 
guarantees, and funds for the export activities. Among them, non-repayable grants to small 
businesses, tax deferrals and tax relief, income support for families, funding dedicated to start-ups.  
 
To cushion the impacts for households, firms, and the entire financial system, the field of 
application for public policies was so diversified:  
▪ measures directed to the healthcare system to deal with the sanitary emergency, 
▪ measures to strengthen the health workforce, 
▪ fiscal measures, 
▪ financial measures, 
▪ social policies to deal with the epidemiological crisis, 
▪ measures adopted for the education system and for Universities, 




▪ measures for cultural goods, activities, and services,  
▪ measures for all the means of transport, both at the national and international level,  
▪ measures for the use of armed forces to control the respect of restrictions,  
▪ measures directed to the Public Administration,  
▪ local finance measures (Camera dei Deputati, 2020).  
Therefore, institutions were engaged in enacting policies at multiple levels. Furthermore, the 
shocks were diffused with a diversified grade of intensity and so for policymakers, the role was 
deliberating targeted policies, both from a fiscal and monetary standpoint (OECD, December 
2020). Different players have been called to act through their different roles: Central Banks took 
significant actions to reduce the systemic stress and support the markets’ confidence, while 
Governments were addressed to make specific national choices. In both cases, the research of the 
right trade-off between short-time effectiveness and the long-time horizon became crucial to avoid 
the implementation of actions purely orientated to the current subsistence without considering the 
sustainability over time.  
From the beginning, aggregated actions became necessary: at the European level, synchronized 
responses were fundamental to weather the crisis and guarantee a recovery. For this reason, on the 
13th of October, the European Commission published the fourth amendment to the Temporary 
Framework for State Aid, which extends all measures, net of recapitalisation measures, until the 
end of June 2021. In March, the rapid progress of the pandemic led the European Commission to 
take official actions, starting with a process of adaptation of the European regulatory measures to 
the new health, social and economic context created by the Covid-19 outbreak. The Commission 
established specific provisions to allow Member States to derogate from the prohibitions of the EU 
Treaty. Under Article 107, the Commission approved the extension of State aid measures granted 
by the Member States, to repair the damage caused by the exceptional occurrence directly to 
specific undertakings or sectors. Indeed, Article 107 of the "Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union” regulates State aid to enterprises. The Commission immediately stressed that, 
beyond the health aspects, it was necessary to manage the economic shock. Therefore, the response 
measures were aimed at ensuring the supply of health systems, preserving the integrity of the 
common market, supporting people to avoid disproportionate effects in terms of income and jobs, 
supporting businesses to ensure the flow of liquidity, and ensuring that each Member State acted 




the Member States to take measures to sustain the economic fabric by way of derogation from the 
normal state aid rules (Camera dei Deputati, December 2020). The framework determined some 
thresholds for aids to specific firms and set the possibility for national Governments to implement 
a category of measures without the Commission’s involvement if they fell outside the scope of 
State aid rules. While other support measures request notification, such as liquidity schemes, 
guarantees on bank loans, or subsidized public loans, flexible export credit insurances. Given the 
exceptionality of the circumstance, the “one time-last time” principle, typically applied to avoid 
economically not viable firms being kept in the market artificially, is excluded. So, reintroducing 
the possibility of favouring some measures, from which the firm has already benefited recently. 
Therefore, the European State aid control helped to ensure an integrated internal market for a faster 
recovery, helped the national support schemes to be effective in helping affected undertakings 
(Camera dei Deputati, December 2020). Concurrently, at the European level, a certain acceleration 
process was addressed to meet the green and digital transition following the future objectives of 
the Union. Interventions mainly directed to the research and development activity, to the provision 
of relevant products to tackle the Coronavirus outbreak, to recapitalization schemes, to public 
support for micro and small companies, to the encouragement for investments in green energy and 
digitalization, and other forms of targeted support (European Commission, 2020). All aimed at 
supporting the principle of transforming disruption into construction, as previously mentioned.   
 
So, the non-discretionary measures in response enacted by four European countries and the United 
Kingdom are summarised in the following presentation. The outline takes the company point of 
view and explores broad topics to lay the foundations of the analysis, the policies presented have 
national validity and are aimed at supporting companies and workers during the crisis. The 
measures have been collected from different sources, such as the International Monetary Fund 
Policy Tracker, the OECD Policy Tracker, the database about State Aids constructed by the 
European Commission, and the KPMG Government Stimulus tracker. Moreover, by referring 
directly to the official websites of the Ministries of Economy and National institutions. Because of 
the rapid evolution of the pandemic, and the relative pace of production of temporary policies, the 
framework is updated to the end of November – first half of December 2020. Except for the Italian 






3. The institutional responses in Spain  
Spain registered the first infection case just after Italy at the end of February 2020. During the first 
wave of contagion lockdown measures were repeatedly extended since March, specifically: from 
the 15th of March to the 21st of June restrictions to the citizens’ mobility were imposed, while from 
the 30th of March to the 9th of April all the non-essential economic activities were shut down. Then 
concurrently with the gradual reopening, social distancing requirements, capacity limitations, and 
hygiene measures remained in place (KPMG, November 2020). On October the 25th, the 
Government declared a new state of emergency until May 9th, 2021 due to the incessant pace of 
diffusion of the second wave of contagion (International Monetary Fund Policy Tracker, 2020). 
During the entire period, several response measures have been put in place. Now starting from the 
labour and social security measures:  
● ERTE scheme: the “Expediente de Regulaciòn Temporal de Empleo”, processed under the Law 
Decree of the 17th of March, provides exceptional measures in case of suspension or reduction 
of the working hours contractually agreed due to the special occurrence represented by the 
Covid-19 outbreak. ERTE is a temporary collective dismissal, through which firms temporarily 
suspend the employment contracts, normally the scheme is used in case of temporary cessation 
of the activities or insufficient income. The procedure should be requested reporting the loss of 
activity measured, then the exemption for social security contributions amounts to the 100% 
for firms with less than 50 employees and 75% in case of firms with more than 50 workers 
registered,  
● Extraordinary measures regarding unemployment benefits: grants were offered to workers, 
particularly to those who work with seasonal contracts, as in the tourism industry and all the 
related represented by the Horeca sector. The measure provided also in cases of non-
compliance with the minimum contribution period. Moreover, the regulatory base for workers’ 
payments in case of illness has increased to 75%, paid by the Social Security Budget,  
● The prohibition of dismissals was imposed in case of reduction in the activities directly caused 
by the health crisis. For the firms benefiting from the Redundancy Scheme (ERTE) the 
commitment to reintegrating workers at the end of the scheme was requested for at least six 
months,  
● The Solvency Support Fund has been established for strategic companies, through a €10 billion 




Fund provides temporary support to non-financial firms in difficulties due to the Covid-19 
pandemic. The eligibility criteria ask for companies not in financial difficulties on the 31st of 
December 2019. Recapitalisation is made through suitable instruments which do not cause 
distortions to the competition, such as convertible debts, share subscription or other types of 
equity instruments. The intervention takes place whether there is evidence that the activity 
interruption would negatively affect the macroenvironment, being strategic enterprises. In case 
of implementation, some conditions were requested to the beneficiary, such as the respect of a 
threshold to the amount restored, a ban on dividends and acquisitions, and a restriction to the 
bonuses enlarged,  
● The Covid-19 Guarantee Facility: a huge intervention to strengthen the level of liquidity of 
companies and self-employed was granted through the Instituto de Credito Oficial (ICO). 
Clearly, the net indebtedness of the latter was raised in order to be prompted to sustain all the 
following measures. A budget of €100 billion for guarantees on new or renewal loans was 
allocated, and the guarantees were intended for the enterprises not in default on the end of 2019 
and without banking procedures on the 17th of March. The maximum amount of the loans was 
set to 25% of 2019 sales or twice the 2019 salaries, as requested by the European regulatory. 
While the maximum maturity for guarantees amounts to five years. The scheme was divided 
into four tranches: the first package of €20 billion, halfway reserved for firms with less than 
250 employees and freelancers, guarantees for up to 80% for SMEs, 70% for large companies’ 
new loans, and 60% for large companies’ renewals, 
● The second and fourth packages amount to €20 billion each – fully intended for companies 
with less than 250 employees and freelancers,   
● The third and fifth packages weighted for €40 billion and they have been fairly allocated 
between firms with less than 250 employees and large companies,  
● The Investment Guarantee Facility: is an instrument to provide lines of guarantee offered 
through a budget of €40 million to support the capital expenditure for companies to adapt, 
extend and renew their production or service capacity. Although the main purpose of the 
measure is pushing for investments, funds may also be used for other purposes such as wages 
or financial and tax obligations. The guarantee amounts to up to 80% for SMEs and self-
employed workers, while 70% for all the other companies. Also for this type of guarantee, the 




● Covid-19 Moratorium: by which the temporary suspension of contractual obligations was 
enacted. Indeed, to facilitate the operating activity, the payments on loans were postponed and 
the reimbursement of principal and/or interests on the current annual amount were readjusted. 
A three-month moratorium on mortgage payments for the most vulnerable, including 
households and self-employed was granted and then also extended,  
● Extraordinary Insurance Cover Facility: the “Compañia Española de Seguros de Crédito a la 
Exportactiòn” (CESCE) administers an extraordinary guarantee to SMEs or unlisted companies 
engaged in the international trade, with at least 33% of sales from international deals or 
regularly carrying out export activities, and currently experiencing liquidity problems. The 
amount allocated is €2 billion and the coverage ratio for the guarantee is up to 80%. Firms in 
state of arrears, in default for Public Administration, or in crisis at the end of the previous 
financial year, were all excluded. In this case, the maximum duration is five years too,  
● Loans to SMEs and self-employed in the tourism sector: loans have been granted at a fixed 
interest rate of 1.5% as maximum, no more than €500 thousand per loan and with a maturity of 
up to 4 years, 
● The AceleraPyme: budgeted €250 million to push for SMEs digitalization, both in terms of 
support to the Research and Development activity and to finance the investment in equipment,  
● Deadlines for tax filing, insolvency declarations, and the preparation of the Financial Statement 
were all extended,  
● The postponement for contract obligations could be requested also for loans granted by 
Autonomous Communities or Local entities, and in general for Public Administration debts,   
● Ad-hoc measures: some specific adjustments were made regarding the regulation governing 
certain sectors and activities, to increase the tolerated flexibility. Especially addressed to the 
most affected ones as the tourism industry, the hospitality sector, to agricultural workers.  
 
4. Government measures enacted in France  
As of December, the 16th, France is the European country counting the greatest number of 
Coronavirus deaths (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020). During the first 
wave of contagion, the measures for mobility restrictions started on the 17th of March until the 11th 
of May, when the containment measures started to be eased. The French economy suffered a 




third one GDP grew by + 18.7% (International Monetary Fund Policy Tracker, 2020). Several 
support measures were addressed to meet companies’ needs:   
● The postponement of Social Security Contribution deadlines: became possible due to the 
restrictions to the economic activities, the requests must be directed to the “Union de 
Recouvrement des Cotisations de Sécurité Sociale et d’Allocations Familiales”, the French 
Organization for the collection of social security and family benefit contributions. According 
to the crisis, the postponement could be for the entire amount or part of it, without any penalties. 
In case of large companies benefiting from the deferral, they were obliged to not distribute 
dividends or buy back shares for the entire financial year,  
● The Partial Activity Scheme: in case of exceptional circumstances, the companies can apply 
for partial activity allowance. Multiple reasons arose due to the Covid-19: employees unable to 
work, closures imposed by the Decrees, drop in the activities, and difficulties at the supply 
level. Whether the employment contract is suspended, the receipt of a compensatory indemnity 
is offered to amount to at least 70% of gross remuneration, increased to the 100% in the case 
of provision of training. According to the sector and how much it has been affected, the 
percentage of reimbursement for employee compensation varies. To benefit from this measure 
no conditions of seniority or type of employment contract matters. The categories of 
beneficiaries have been extended and the allowance paid is considered as replacement income, 
so it is not subject to social security contributions,  
● Economic dismissals were generally subject to increased scrutiny. Normally, they represent a 
possibility in case of a time persistent change in at least one economic indicator and following 
technological changes or a company reorganization. Certainly, Covid-19 does not constitute 
itself a layoff reason,  
● Companies operating in the essential sectors do not follow the public rules about daily working 
time, daily rest period, and weekly working time to guarantee a full-time service, 
● State-guaranteed loans: the volume of the loan is limited to the 25% of 2019 sales and the 
guarantees are offered at 90%-80%-70% depending on the turnover of the company. The 
financial sector is entirely excluded, certain real estate too and the defaulted companies on the 
31st of December 2020. In the case of companies with fewer than 5,000 employees and a 
turnover smaller than €1.5 billion, the company can apply for multiple loans. Even in this case, 




● BPI Assurance Export: for the export companies public guarantees of up to 90% for SMEs and 
up to 70% for other enterprises are at disposal. For a period of six months in form of guarantees 
or pre-financing guarantees for export projects, moreover, the Cap Francexport reinsurance 
scheme for short-term export credits was extended,   
● The possibility of renegotiating credit lines: for any company and of any size, the State and the 
Bank of France support the negotiation for rescheduling bank loans, 
● Repayable advances: for Small and Medium enterprises with difficulties in achieving financing 
amounts, a budget of €500 million was earmarked directed to fragile firms in the need of cash,  
● Tourism sector: “Caisse des Dépôts”, a French public financial institution, deploys €3.6 billion 
in loans, quasi-equity, and equity instruments to support the sector until 2023. Moreover, 
specific interventions were implemented such as a web national platform dedicated to the 
digitalisation of tourism,  
● Exceptional participating loans: for small and very small businesses, which do not obtain a 
State-guaranteed loan: equity loans of up to €10 thousand or €50 thousand according to the size 
may be granted for a specific period, the support may be used for working capital needs or the 
investment plan, 
● The Fonds de Solidarité offered tax-free aid for micro-companies and self-employed to cover 
fixed costs. The player is eligible if it suffered a loss of at least 50% of the turnover, the aid 
amounts to €1,500, and the fund is financed through the State, the regions, local authorities, 
and private contributors,  
● Régime Cadre Temporaire: is a scheme open to all the sectors, which offers a 15% bonus for 
cross-border collaboration for projects of Research and Development activity, relevant for the 
emergency support,  
● The closing and approval of financial accounts: the time limit for presenting annual financial 
statements and approving accounts and documents attached has been extended by three months, 
● Insolvency procedure: during the whole period of the health emergency, it is assessed based on 
the financial situation of the debtor on the 12th of March 2020 and the postponement can be 
asked, moreover the deadlines for the Safeguard plan and Restructuring plan have been 
extended. 
On the 3rd of September, a new package, the Plan de Relance, to support the recovery of the French 




● The Green Economy: €30 billion allocated to speed up the investments and expenditures 
directed to industry decarbonisation, sustainable mobility, support the railway transportation, 
and for the development of green hydrogen,  
● To support the competitiveness and economic resilience at the national level: a budget of €34 
billion was allocated to boost investments in industrial innovation, to support export activities, 
to support the grant of equity capital to businesses strategically relevant for the country, but 
also to the strengthening of the healthcare system, to the Research and Development for goods 
and services essential to cope with the virus, professional training support. To the initial budget, 
an additional €36 billion were allocated.  
● Direct support is offered to microenterprises, independent workers, and low-income 
households through grants and bonuses. 
 
5. The actions of the German Federal Government  
The Federal Government has released several packages of responses to the Covid-19 outbreak and 
the role of KfW, the German public bank born at the end of the Second World War, has been crucial 
for a relevant part of them. The State-owned bank KfW has been really facilitating the access of 
companies to the supply of short-term liquidity. Germany adopted different measures of lockdown, 
generally less stringent than in the other European countries (KPMG, December 2020). In addition 
to the Federal Government schemes, federal states have announced their own measures of support 
through direct or indirect channels. To fight against the second wave of infections, further measures 
were released and most of the schemes implemented were extended and re-budgeted. To have an 
idea, the overall support for Start-Ups and SMEs from June to December 2020 amounts to €25 
billion (International Monetary Fund Policy Tracker, 2020). Starting from the employment-related 
measures, those are the main policies for enterprises:  
● The Act of Short-Time Working (Kurzarbeit) has been extended until the end of 2021 and it is 
aimed to facilitate the access to short-time working compensation, also for temporary workers, 
and to release firms from the social security contributions. The compensation is paid for one 
year or two – in case of those requesting already registered on the 31st of December 2019 for 
reduced hour compensation. To obtain this measure, at least ten percent of the firm’s employees 




● The Refund of Social Security Contributions ensures for the companies, which fall within the 
scope of the latter measure, a full reimbursement until the end of the first semester of 2021 by 
the Federal Labour Office, successively followed by a semi-refund. For this measure, an initial 
budget of €5.3 billion was allocated,  
● In case of an employee quarantined, the employer must pay the regular salary for up to six 
weeks, then at the seventh week 70% of the net salary is paid by the health insurance company,  
● The Economic Stabilisation Fund was implemented through an overall budget of €600 billion. 
The Fund earmarked €100 billion to direct recapitalization measures to ensure the solvency of 
large companies, not in financial difficulties on the 31st of December 2019, without other 
funding alternatives and with a definite future perspective. Smaller companies and start-ups 
may also be eligible, if strategically relevant and financially sound, while ones from the 
financial sector and credit institutes normally not. Whether a company receives support from 
the Fund, some restrictions regarding management compensation, bonuses, dividends, and 
other profit distributions are imposed. The Fund also mobilized €400 billion for guarantees to 
help firms resisting liquidity restrictions, and €100 billion dedicated to KfW, the Public 
Development Bank, to facilitate the supply of liquidity to firms,  
● KfW Entrepreneur Loan and ERP Start-Up Loan are schemes destined to companies on the 
market for longer or no longer than five years, respectively. Guarantees up to 80% for large 
enterprises or 90% for SMEs. The scheme has a maximum duration of ten years and is restricted 
to working capital loans up to €1 billion,  
● VR Smart Flexible Promotional Loan is a measure destined to firms on the market for at least 
three years and German-based, without the necessity of provision of collateral and the interest 
rate varying depending on the creditworthiness. Loans accepted up to 25% revenues of 2019 
and without any charges for two years,  
● KfW Special Programme 2020 offers syndicated financing, with a minimum of €25 million and 
a maximum being the greater between 30% of total balance sheet assets and 50% total debt, 
where KfW assumes 80% of the risk. It is aimed to support investments and working capital 
needs of medium-sized and large enterprises, in this case, the distribution of profit or dividends 
was not allowed, and the maximum credit term is ten years,  
● A co-investment in start-ups through KfW bringing forward a first tranche of an already 




Immediate Assistance Programme envisages a direct grant, of up to €15 thousand per firm, to 
cover the operating costs, dedicated to self-employed and small firms with up to 10 employees,  
● The KfW fast track loan for mid-sized companies offers a quick loan for operating costs, with 
a volume set at up to 25% of the firm’s revenues in 2019 and fully guaranteed by the Federal 
Government. For this measure, the cumulative with other measures is not permitted except for 
the grants awarded under the emergency aid programs. The maximum term is a decade, 
provision of collaterals unnecessary, banks do not assess the level of risk of the firm, 100% risk 
assumption by KfW,  
● To support the German export industry, a relief in fees for export credit guarantees was 
introduced. Some agreements on customer loans were released: between April and June 2020, 
all the payments were postponed by three months if they suffered a decline in income directly 
related to Covid-19,  
● The suspension of the obligation to file for insolvency was retroactively suspended from March 
to September 2020, exclusively for firms suffering economic difficulties or becoming illiquid 
for the Covid-19 pandemic. If necessary, there is the possibility of extension in case of over-
indebtedness while the condition to obtain the grant uniquely depends on the existence of a 
reasonable statement of recovery,  
● “Securing training places”: is a Federal Programme for which €500 million are allocated to 
support SMEs in terms of human resources. The aid consists in €2,000 for each vocational 
training contract completed in 2020/2021, €3,000 for each vocational training contract 
completed above regular number, €3,000 for each hired employed in vocational training from 
insolvent firms due to Covid-19,  
● Restart Culture Programme: funds, totally amounting to €1 billion, were destined to support 
cultural activities, the biggest portion of €480 million to preserve various cultural institutions 
and projects, other packages destined to pandemic related investments, alternative digital 
offers, private radio,   
● Financial support for consultancy services: a maximum grant of €3,200 from the Federal 
Government is designated to the SMEs based in Germany, for which more than 50% of their 
turnover is generated from consultancy. The measure applies even if the SME is a distressed 
company,  
● Aid for SMEs which suffer at least 30% of revenue decline or 50% for two consecutive months, 




● KfW Special Credit Programme for non-profit organizations and municipal enterprises,  
● Corona aid package by the Federal State Baden-Wuerttemberg for an amount of €1.5 billion 
dedicated to different players such as public transport network, hotel industry and catering 
trade, restaurants,  
● November Aid through a budget of €14 billion for companies directly or indirectly affected by 
the closures, up to €1 million the reimbursement amounts to 75% of the average daily revenue 
generated in November 2019,  
● The Public Investment Plan for 2020/2021: €60 billion allocated for digitalization, security and 
defence, to the enhancement of the transportation infrastructure, the reinforcement of the 
healthcare system, and technological innovation.  
 
6. The public schemes in the United Kingdom  
On December 8th, the United Kingdom became the first Western country administering the Pfizer-
BionTech vaccine (CNN, 2020), ahead of the United States and the European Union. Since the first 
wave of Covid-19, lockdown measures in the United Kingdom were mostly driven by a laissez-
faire approach, then partially abandoned due to the increasing trend of the contagion rate. The 
measures of restriction, for which part of the non-essential economic activities were stopped, have 
been applied from the 23rd of March to the 13th of May. While slight restrictions to the citizens’ 
mobility and the closure of some non-essential retail stores were preserved until July 4th. As a result 
of the second wave, a national lockdown was determined on November 5th (OECD Policy Tracker, 
2020). Similar restrictions and interventions in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  
 
● The Job Retention Scheme (JRS) was established to help employers maintain their workforce 
during the downturn. The employers can claim a subsidiary for labour costs of individuals who 
are temporarily not working, having a part-time contract, or are on leave, up to a maximum of 
£2,500 per month per employee. The measure was planned to end at the end of November 2020, 
conversely it has been extended until the end of March 2021. This aid is also available for start-
ups: employers can ask for a share of the furlough’s monthly wage costs up to a fixed threshold,  
● The Kickstart Scheme is a measure of employment support targeted for young people at risk of 




people (16-24), the Government has undertaken to pay the first six months of wages, the 
National Insurance contribution, and pension contributions, up to the end of 2021,  
● Apprentice Scheme and Traineeship Scheme are two measures both in support of the young 
workforce, available only in England. The first one provides grants – £2,000 if 16-24 aged or 
£1500 if aged 25 or over – to the companies committed to hiring young people for apprentice 
periods. Whereas the second program provides £1,000 for each new traineeship position 
created. In addition to these efforts, an increasing public engagement was reserved to augment 
resources for skills enhancement and to facilitate the reinsertion in the job market,  
● Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) refund granted to small firms and start-ups to cover all types of 
expenses for employees, in the event of up to two weeks of absence caused by Covid-19, 
● Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS): a scheme offering grants to self-employed 
workers adversely affected, the taxable grant worth 80% of the average monthly earnings over 
the last three years. The scheme has been extended until April 2021, in response to the second 
wave, for those continuing to actively trade but facing reduced demand. From November 2020 
to January 2021, the taxable grant has been reduced to 40% of the monthly earnings. 
Furthermore, during the month of November, the Government launched a new program to 
support job research people receiving unemployment benefits for at least thirteen weeks. While 
businesses once again are required to close due to the restrictions, the Government pays two-
thirds of the employees ‘salaries and covers social contributions,  
● The Future Fund has been established by the Government as a £500 million loan scheme to 
support high-growth companies in their development. The Fund is composed of public funds 
and private contributions and it is made in partnership with the British Business Bank. The 
companies based in the United Kingdom can receive an amount of up to £5 million and loans 
will be automatically converted into equity. Besides, unlisted companies can request it, 
provided that in the last five years they raised at least £25,000 in equity investments.  
 
To manage the necessity of liquidity for companies, the Government has launched three separate 
schemes to facilitate access to credit, through the British Business Bank:  
• The Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) is dedicated to the support of 
SMEs carrying out a public guarantee of 80% for loans up to £5 million and with interest costs 
covered for the first year. The financing is for maturity of up to six years and made through 




● Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS) that is destined to firms with 
greater turnovers, it offers a public guarantee of 80% for loans up to £25, while the loan 
guaranteed could reach £50 million, for companies with turnover greater than £250 million,  
● The Bounce Back Loan scheme is dedicated to small businesses offering a full guarantee and 
any interest or fee payments for the first year, for loans up to 25% of the sales, up to £50,000, 
● Pay as you Grow has been added in September 2020 to allow firms to extend the period for the 
repayments and to stop the repayment schedule entirely for certain periods or just paying the 
interests and tax reliefs for businesses, following their size,  
● The Covid-19 Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) managed by the Bank of England and 
dedicated to buying a commercial paper of large companies, to fund those in good financial 
status before the outbreak,  
● Guarantee Scheme of up to £10 billion has been established to support Trade Credit Insurance 
for business-to-business transactions, limited to cover the credit originated until the end of 
2020,  
● Targeted support through grants and loan payments for the SMEs directly committed in the 
RandD activity, as part of a wider package of support for innovative firms, a green stimulus of 
£3 billion to encourage environmental initiatives, such as the improvement of energy 
efficiency,  
● £750 million have been allocated for frontline charities across the United Kingdom, which have 
had a crucial role in the fight against the disease, and almost £2 billion was allocated to support 
cultural and arts industries,  
● In the United Kingdom, Three-Tier Coronavirus alert levels have been established and local 
restrictions vary according to them. The businesses in Tier 3 can request a grant of £3000 per 
month, 
● Lastly, grants were disposable for businesses in the hospitality, accommodation, and leisure 
sectors in high alert areas: grants worth up to £2,100 a month.  
 
7. The Italian institutional context  
On the 31st of January 2020, the Italian Council of Ministers declared the State of Emergency for 
the entire nation. Italy was the first country in Europe to suffer heavily from the Covid-19 outbreak 




began in March 2020 through the “Cura Italia” Decree which provided immediate measures to 
protect the citizens and the labour market – with an effect of about €20 billion. A few weeks later, 
the Liquidity Decree envisaged broader measures to protect the liquidity of households and 
businesses. “With this decree, we are implementing an unprecedented intervention to support the 
liquidity of the Italian production system, helping it to overcome the crisis”, said the Minister for 
Economic Affairs and Finance – Roberto Gualtieri. To ensure the necessary liquidity for 
households and businesses, the Government allocated more than €75 billion, with reference to the 
loans moratorium and the exceptional guarantees granted through the Guarantee Fund for SMEs 
and “Garanzia Italia” managed by SACE (MEF, 2020). Subsequently, in May the Relaunch Decree 
was enacted, and it represented the most extensive economic response in Italian recent history, 
being worth €155 billion (Camera dei Deputati, 2020). The latter Decree allocated €12 billion of 
liquidity to regions and local authorities to support them as well in the liquidity shortages incurred 
(MEF, 2020). Concerning the restrictions to mobility, in Italy, lockdown measures started for some 
specific areas where the first contagion cases were discovered, and then since the 9th of March 2020 
the entire country was subjected to personal mobility restrictions. All the non-essential economic 
activities were shut down from March 25th to April 27th, those activities accounted for about one 
third of the Italian total value added; at least two thirds when considering only the Horeca sector 
(Banca d'Italia, May 2020).  
The Government commitment continued with the August Decree, for which a budget of €25 billion 
was earmarked, determining new sector-specific policies, and allocating additional resources 
(Senato della Repubblica, 2020). Moreover, it ensured the continuity over time of the Guarantee 
Fund for SME and extended the duration for the moratorium on loans and mortgages. 
Subsequently, as the second wave of contagion stemmed out, the Government enacted the four 
amendments “Decreto Ristori” in a few weeks, for a total of €18 billion in terms of net 
indebtedness. From the latter, a set of rapid measures for the sectors most impacted by the new 
restrictions were released, including non-repayable contributions, new weeks of redundancy 
scheme, reduction, and suspension in taxes. Therefore, during the entire year 2020 the Italian 
Government and Parliament have been committed to allocating an unprecedented budget to address 
the emergency: more than €108 billion in terms of net indebtedness, through flexible budget 
variances. The ordinances issued were several, as typically the measures were released with limited 
effectiveness to graduate the response following the evolution of the epidemiological situation:  




▪ Law Decree n.23/2020 – Liquidità 
▪ Law Decree n.34/2020 – Rilancio 
▪ Law Decree n.104/2020 – Agosto  
▪ Law Decree n.137/2020 – Ristori 
▪ Law Decree n.149/2020 – Ristori bis 
▪ Law Decree n.154/2020 – Ristori ter  
▪ Law Decree n.157/2020 – Ristori quater 
The main sectors affected by the first four packages of measures issued and the relative percentages 
of incidence are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Sectors targeted by the first four packages of measures 
(Source: Dossier October 2020, Camera dei deputati) 
The support measures dedicated to the companies, as in many other countries, can be grouped 
under the headings of liquidity support, measures for export and internationalisation, support for 
capitalisation, non-repayable grants, suspension of certain tax obligations, temporary relief on 
fixed costs, interventions for companies in crisis, industrial reconversion, and support for growth 




€35 billion to support the labour market, preserve the employment level and guarantee adequate 
levels of income for workers and families (MEF, 2020). Starting from employment-related 
measures, the main responses enacted by the Italian Government are summarised as follows: 
● Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG): €4 billion have been allocated to the extension of the fund 
to supplement the earnings of employees. The Government has expanded the possibility of 
accessing, whenever Covid-19 has been the reason for which business activity was suspended 
or reduced. The employees are entitled to 80% of their salary as a monthly amount. At a first 
time, the period for granting was set only at nine weeks, then repeatedly extended. Employers 
requesting for the second tranche, as the emergency period was extended, should pay an 
additional contribution determined on the comparison between 2020-2019 revenues of the first 
semester. That is not the case if revenues were contracted by twenty percent or more, and for 
those on the market for no longer than one year. The measure is directed to all sectors, also in 
the case of firms already benefiting from the Extraordinary Redundancy Fund.  
● The New Skills Fund was set up by the National Agency for Active Labour Policies (ANPAL) 
for covering the expenses incurred to guarantee training courses, to fulfil social contributions, 
to support associations and trade unions redefining the working hour scheme, allocating part to 
the training and the improvement of new skills, following both the organizational and 
production needs,  
● Social security contributions exemption for companies, in the first period some turnover 
thresholds imposed in relation to the impact on the economic activities. Those who do not 
request for extension of support wage schemes shall be exempted for up to four months until 
the end of the year. Moreover, in the case of hiring employees with permanent agreements or 
transforming the contract from temporary to permanent, the total exemption is released for up 
to six months from the day of the contract stipulation.  
● Ban on termination for employment agreements: both in case of an individual or collective 
agreement. Preclusions not applicable in case of cessation of the activities or in the case of 
presentation of a collective agreement of incentive to leave. All layoff procedures started after 
the 23rd of February must be suspended.  
● Several additional measures were implemented to preserve the labour market: a 30% relief on 
pension contributions for companies located in Southern Italy between October and December. 
An agreement between the Italian Banking Association, INPS and Trade Unions for 




set up dedicated to certain categories and during different periods, in most cases amounting to 
€1,000. For instance, seasonal workers in tourism, entertainment, maritime workers, artisans, 
traders, occasional workers, VAT holders with a substantial decrease in monthly income. The 
emergency income was granted to families in difficulty, an amount ranging from €400 and 
€800. Subsidy from local authorities to contribute to wage costs of companies to avoid 
redundancies, the renewal of fixed-term contracts granted once for a maximum of one year, 
even without specific motivation. Lastly, the specific measures for parental leave and care for 
disabled family members were extended at the maximum duration permitted, and tax credits 
for the sanitation of the workplaces.  
● The moratorium on financing for micro-companies and SMEs operating in Italy without 
deteriorated exposures on the 17th of March 2020. Applicable to overdraft facilities, loans for 
advances on credit instruments, maturities of short-term loans and instalments of loans and 
instalments of leasing instalments falling due for a total value of loans above €300 billion. 
Covid-19 is interpreted as an exceptional event, so firms that have already obtained debt 
suspension or restructuring measures may also apply. The enterprises must self-certify that they 
have suffered a temporary shortage of liquidity. The measure was initially in place until the 
30th of September 2020 but then extended to the 31st of January 2021. For businesses as the 
tourism sector, further extended to the 31st of March 2021. 
● “Garanzia Italia” – SACE: directed to medium-large enterprises, and in any case for those that 
have exhausted their capacity to access the SME Guarantee Fund. SACE S.p.A grants 
guarantees in favour of qualified entities to exercise credit in Italy. For any form of financing, 
enterprises of any size after having fully utilised their capacity to access the Guarantee Fund 
for SMEs as well as to the guarantees provided by ISMEA. The entire commitments assumed 
must not exceed €200 billion, of which at least €30 billion earmarked for SMEs. Within the 
31st of December 2020, at the following conditions: duration not exceeding six years, the 
enterprise not classified as in difficulty on 31st December nor having impaired exposures to the 
banking sector. Companies admitted to the arrangement procedure with business continuity, 
entered debt restructuring agreements or with a plan suitable to allow the rehabilitation of the 
company's debt exposure may still benefit. Conforming to the State Aid Temporary 
Framework, the amount of guaranteed loan must not exceed the greater between 25% of the 
2019 annual turnover and twice the personnel costs for 2019. The coverage ratio ranges 




and 90% for the firms with turnover up to €1.5 billion and less than five thousand employees. 
In the latter case, a simplified procedure is granted. Lastly, the 80% of coverage is ensured for 
the middle turnover range and more than five thousand employees. Specific commitments are 
required to the beneficiaries: not approving dividends or buy back, manage employment levels, 
and to allocate the funding to certain kinds of business expenditure, such as personnel costs, 
investment expenditures, or working capital of businesses located in Italy. 
● Guarantee Fund for SMEs renewed the offering of simplified procedures, increased the 
guarantee coverage, and enlarged the pool of beneficiaries. Companies and professionals who 
wish to obtain guarantees from the fund must apply to banks or accredited Confidi, a 
consortium of other guarantee funds. The guarantees are addressed to SMEs, natural persons 
engaged in business, arts, or professions, brokers, insurance agents and sub-agents, and third 
sector entities. Guarantees are distributed automatically and can be applied to operations 
already disbursed, but not more than three months before the application. The intervention 
covers with 100% guarantee for small loans up to €30,000 with a maximum repayment time of 
ten years, while normally it amounts to six years, and without the assessment of 
creditworthiness. Loans may not exceed 25% of revenues or twice the salary costs in the last 
financial year, in accordance with the Temporary Framework. Whereas, for greater loans up to 
€5 million, the coverage is 90%. The maximum amount can be reached also by adding several 
smaller applications one after the other. If the amount is up to €800 thousand and revenues up 
to €3.2 million: 90% through the Guarantee fund and 10% through Confidi. The guarantee is 
free of charge. The aim of the scheme is to enable guarantees for more than €100 billion. In the 
case of agricultural, fishing, and other specific forms of enterprises, ISMEA guarantees were 
granted for loans up to €30,000.  
● Support measures for export and internationalization: SACE promotes the internationalisation 
of the production and business Italian sector, giving priority to those which are strategic for the 
Italian economy. SACE is a society wholly owned by Cassa Depositi e Prestiti S.p.A and in 
turn State-controlled. SACE holds 76% of SIMEST and together they constitute the export and 
internationalisation hub of the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti Group (CDP) (Camera dei Deputati, 
3/12/2020). Fund for integrated promotion towards foreign markets has been set up, with a final 
endowment of €763 million (MEF, 2020). The fund is aimed also through ICE, the Italian 
Agency for the Promotion of Business Internationalization, at an extraordinary communication 




provision of non-repayable co-financing for companies operating in foreign markets. 
Moreover, since “August Decree” a section is dedicated to the internationalisation processes of 
trade fair organisations.  
● SIMEST supports the companies in their internationalization efforts through subsidised loans, 
capital participations and export credit support. Firms can access liquidity without the need of 
guarantees and obtain up to 40% non-refundable. Subsidised loans became even more 
favourable in terms of scope and eligible beneficiaries. The facilitated financing is 
distinguished in interventions for: capitalisation, fairs, and exhibitions, to enter the 
International Markets, Temporary Export Manager, E-Commerce, Feasibility Studies, 
Technical Assistance Programmes. 
● A non-refundable grant is provided to persons engaged in business, self-employment, and 
agricultural income, holding a VAT number, with a turnover of up to €5 million and a drop in 
turnover in April 2020 compared to April 2019 of at least 33%. The size of the contribution 
varies in relation to turnover, minimum value of €1,000 for individuals and €2,000 for firms 
and entities. The contribution is paid by “Agenzia delle Entrate” applying a percentage of 20% 
for persons with revenues or proceeds up to €400,000; 15% for persons with revenues or 
proceeds from between €400 thousand and €1 million; 10% for persons with revenues or fees 
higher than €1 million and up to €5 million. 
● Fondo Patrimonio PMI is aimed at companies that decide to invest in their own relaunch. For 
companies with a capital increase of at least €250,000, it operates through the purchase of bonds 
and debt securities issued by the firm. The budget allocated to the fund is 4 billion euro and 
bonds must be purchased by the end of 2020. Bonds or other newly issued debt securities must: 
be reimbursed at the end of the sixth year after subscription, nominal value not less than 
€10,000; the subsidised annual rate being 1.75% for the first year, 2% for the second and third 
years and 2.50% for the remaining years. Interest may be capitalised and paid in a lump sum at 
maturity. The maximum amount to be subscribed in securities is the lower between three-times 
capital increase and 12.5% of 2019 turnover. The funding received must be for personnel costs, 
investments or working capital use. In no case it may be used to pay past debts. There could be 
a bonus in the reimbursement, provided the firm achieve one or more of the following 
objectives: maintaining employment, investments for environmental protection, investments in 
enabling technologies for Industry 4.0 for given amounts. Applications are evaluated on a first-




on the purchase of own shares, or quotas and on repaying loans until the financial instruments 
will be fully repaid.  
● “Fondo di Rilancio”: capital enhancement for medium and large enterprises for turnovers of €5 
million < X < €50 million and decreased by at least 33%, a tax exemption on capital increases 
and financial support are carried out for the operations made within the end of 2020: 20% tax 
credit for a capital increase, 50% for losses exceeding 10% of equity. While, in the case of 
turnover €10 million < X < €50 million, for capital increase of at least €250 thousand, a co-
investment by the State in financial instruments issued by the company ad hoc, with six years 
duration and no payments before maturity. They clearly help to strengthen the solvency and 
capacity to cope with the shock. In the case of companies with a turnover greater than €50 
million and operating in Italy, not belonging to the financial, banking, or insurance sector, 
support for recapitalisation through dedicated “Cassa Depositi Prestiti” funds: interventions at 
market conditions or according to defined criteria are carried out: preferably subscription of 
convertible or subordinated loans. In the assessment of intervention, the technological 
development, strategic infrastructure, crucial production chains, the labour market and 
environmental sustainability are considered.  
● Guarantee for insurers of trade receivables: a scheme administered by SACE to ensure the trade 
credit insurance availability. The State acts as the ultimate guarantor, so creating a 'reinsurance' 
instrument allocated to the insurance companies of short-term trade receivables to prevent 
losses leading to a contraction of credit lines to companies, 
● A budget of €4 billion was allocated for the interruption of regional production tax IRAP for 
those companies with an evident economic damage and turnover up to €250 million, excluding 
the banking and insurance sector. The tax has been suspended for the entire financial year of 
2019 and the first rate of 2020.  
● Venture Capital Support Fund: refinanced to support innovative start-ups in the measure of 
relief granted and of soft loans, too. The measures are aimed to strengthen the capital of those 
innovative institutions.  
● Smart and Start Italia: €100 million for 2020, allocating resources to subsidised financing for 
start-ups, for the granting of non-repayable contributions aimed at the acquisition of services 
provided by incubators, accelerators, innovation hubs, business angels and other public or 




● Fund to support liquidity: increased for €1.67 billion for the operation of local and regional 
authorities, the one for the operation of the regions and autonomous provinces has been 
increased by €2.8 billion. Measures for the payment of commercial debts and to compensate 
lower revenues from tourist tax, Tosap and Cosap, IMU and to support public transport.  
● Technology Transfer Fund has been set up with a budget of €500 million for 2020, aimed at 
promoting initiatives and investments to exploit and use research results in local companies, 
with reference to innovative start-ups and innovative SMEs. 
● Fund to safeguard employment levels and the continuation of business activity has been 
established at the Ministry of Economic Development, with a budget of €300 million for 2020. 
Initially, the fund was aimed at rescuing and restructuring companies with historic brands of 
national interest and companies with historical trademarks of national interest and joint stock 
companies with at least 250 employees, in a state of economic and financial difficulty. In 
addition, the Fund directed also to the rescue and restructuring of companies which, regardless 
of company size, have assets and relationships of strategic importance for the national interest. 
● Nuova Marcora: the “August Decree” refinanced with €10 million the fund established to foster 
the creation of cooperative companies and their development. The measure provides for 
subsidies loans, all the cooperatives registered and not in voluntary liquidation or in bankruptcy 
proceedings are eligible. Loans have a maximum duration of ten years, granted for an amount 
not exceeding €1 million, whether they are granted for investments, they might cover up to 
100% of the project,  
● Nuova Sabatini, refinanced by €64 million from the August Decree, is a measure to support the 
granting to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises of subsidised financing for the 
investments in new machinery, plant, and equipment, capital goods investments for productive 
use, as well as digital technologies.  
● The entry into force of the Crisis and Insolvency Code has been postponed until September 
2021, and the rules on compulsory capital reduction to cover losses have been suspended during 
the entire emergency period. All the appeals for declarations of bankruptcy or insolvency are 
not admissible. The deadlines for the fulfilment of preventive agreements and restructuring 
agreements already approved have been extended. The 2020 Financial Statements can be 
written on a going concern basis if the business was treated in this way when the pandemic 




● Funding companies producing medical devices and personal protective equipment: through 
INVITALIA, an Italian Government agency 100% owned by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, aimed at investment attraction and enterprise development, as managing entities. For 
this purpose, €50 million were authorised, for the granting of concessions to investment 
programs aimed at increasing the national disposability. The subsidies consist of a soft loan of 
up to 75% of the eligible costs. 
● Other measures worth note: €1.5 billion were allocated for measures to strengthen the assets of 
state-controlled companies through capital increases or alternative forms of capitalisation to 
support soundness and revitalisation and development programs. Furthermore, temporary 
reductions in the cost of electricity bills for SMEs, and the rent relief at 60%, deferment for the 
payments of Public Administration debts. Non repayable grants: to restaurant businesses if the 
turnover for the period between March-June 2020 was less than three quarters of the 2019 
turnover. The exemption from IMU for bathing establishments and properties belonging to the 
D2 cadastral classification, exemption from IMU until 2023 for cinemas and theatres. Tax 
credit from 30% to 65% for investments for improvement expenses for businesses in the 
hospitality and spa tourism sector. Exemption from Tosap and Cosap for holders of public land 
concessions. Development contracts: €500 million were allocated for Development Contracts, 
€50 million for the Voucher Innovation Manager.  
 
Since the second wave started to spread out, new restrictions were imposed and another contraction 
in the activities impacted the economic sectors, already particularly affected. To protect these 
segments and the workforce, a new Decree providing simpler, faster, and more effective measures 
was enacted. To the first version of “Ristori Decree” three more versions have been added during 
the month of November 2020, with additional modifications each time. Totally, about €18 billion 
were allocated through those provisions: 
• a new tranche of contributions to firms which have been forced to close or limit the activity, 
due to the exceptional occurrence. For those with a turnover greater than €5 million, a grant of 
10% of the decrease experienced in sales is released; the total maximum amount reaches 
€150,000,  
• additional €410 million were allocated to the budget of €265 million previously allocated, for 




• the Fund aimed at compensating the losses incurred by trade fair and the congress sector was 
enhanced by €350 million,  
• a fund with a budget of €100 million euro was set up to support companies in the agricultural, 
fishing and aquaculture sectors affected by the restrictive measures,  
• €190 million for the Fund in support of cinema and the audio-visual sector,  
• €50 million for the Fund dedicated to cultural enterprises and institutions,  
• tax credit on rents was extended, for those affected by the restrictions, to the months of October, 
November, and December 2020, and for companies with revenues greater than €5 million, and 
a sales drop of at least 50%, in relation to 2019,  
• the Ordinary Redundancy Fund has been extended up to six additional weeks, for which an 
additional contribution will be paid measured on the total wage that would have been due to 
the employee. The rate for it varies on the reduction in turnover: 18% for employers without 
any reduction, 9% for a reduction in turnover smaller than 20%, and no contribution if the 
reduction in turnover has been by 20% or greater,  
• individual dismissal procedures as well as the collective ones remain precluded, and those 
started after the 23rd of February have been suspended, except for the reason of definitive 
cessation of the activities,  
• some non-repayable contributions were granted to support the affected economic activities 
operating in the so called “Red Regions”, those regions characterized by the higher contagion 
rates. The list of Ateco codes has been broadened, to further extend the eligible beneficiaries 
of a contribution up to €150,000, differentiated by economic sector,  
• the second payment of IRPEF, IRES, and IRAP have been postponed for companies operating 
in “orange” and “red zones”, for all the enterprises with a turnover not greater than €50 million 
recordings a 33% decrease in turnover in the first six months of 2020 compared to the same 
period in 2019,   
• the payment of social security contributions, withholding taxes and VAT for November and 
December 2020 were suspended for all the businesses with sales up to €50 million and which 
have recorded a 33% drop in turnover in November 2020 compared to November 2019,  
• a new one-off allowance of €1,000 is available for categories of workers such as seasonal 




workers not related to the tourism activity but whose activities have been affected by the 
epidemic emergency. 
The general outlook about the main national support schemes implemented by four European 
countries and the United Kingdom has shown the prompt response of each State and the evidence 
that some common patterns were followed by each of them. Considering concurrently the measures 
implemented to support the labour market, guarantee a minimum income for workers, different 
subsidies and suspension of payments, financial instruments to recapitalise companies, non-
repayable grants, and other different interventions to guarantee the going concern.  
One of the most crucial aspects of the crisis corresponds to the state of liquidity at the household, 
corporate, and macroeconomic level. In a period of economic contraction, all the possible efforts 
to prevent the real economic effects to be transferred to the credit sector are needed. Indeed, both 
the households and the businesses are at risk of seeing their income eroded, affecting their ability 
to meet financial commitments and this may lead to difficulties in access to credit (Ministero 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2020).  
Henceforth, the focus of the dissertation will be on the public responses to the liquidity crunch 
experienced by the Italian companies. In particular, the focus will be on the Public Guarantee 
Schemes, seen through the point of view of academic literature, and then on the analysis of the 
Italian Guarantee Fund for SMEs. Public guarantees represent a measure strongly used to promptly 
respond to liquidity shortages (Gobinath, 2020). At the company level, the interruptions to the 
supply chains, the foreign demand contractions, and the drop in sales may have fewer substantially 
the corporate cash inflows and the generation of income.  
In the next chapter, the Public Credit Guarantee Schemes will be explained through the help of 







Addressing liquidity needs through Public Credit Guarantees 
 
1. Liquidity at corporate level 
The concept of liquidity is easier to recognize than to define. At root, it represents the ease through 
which value can be created from assets: either by using creditworthiness to obtain external funding 
or by selling assets in the marketplace (Crockett, 2008). Liquidity defines the ability of an asset to 
transform itself into purchasing power without any loss of time or value (Neppi Modona and 
D'Adda, 1985). To provide a clearer distinction for this elusive notion, the European Central Bank 
Working Paper (Nikolaou, 2009) defines: 
▪ market liquidity as the ability of trading in both the interbank market and the asset market,  
▪ funding liquidity as the notion regarding how easily economic agents can obtain external 
finance and how financial institutions perform their intermediation functions,  
▪ and Central Bank liquidity explaining the “Lender of last resort” function of the Central Bank.  
All the above interpretations are interrelated, but one last should be considered: corporate liquidity. 
The latter refers to the extent to which a business has access to cash or items readily exchangeable 
for cash (Weetman, 2006). Firms commonly own assets characterized by different degrees of 
liquidity (John, 1993), and the cash positions held could vary from firms constantly focused on 
liquidity to firms with a solid safety cushion able to absorb and mitigate any mismatches between 
cash forecasts and actuals (European Banking Association, 2018). The level of corporate liquidity 
is clearly affected by some internal and external factors and – assuming disparate motivations of 
frictions – liquidity management may represent a key issue during periods of crisis (Almeida, et 
al., 2014). In fact, among the drives to hold liquid funds for a company, one considers the liquidity 
buffer as a business lever able to mitigate the financial shocks (Baki Yilmaz, 2016). Whereas 
another reason could be the capacity of timely seizing growth opportunities: “Finance theory would 
advise this firm to evaluate the investment opportunity as if it already had plenty of cash in hand” 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Keynes (1936) identified the most urgent liquidity need whenever a 
mismatch between costs and receipt of sale proceeds happens, reflecting exactly one of the main 
effects of the Covid-19 outbreak. As just mentioned, the so-called precautionary motive (Keynes, 
1936; La Rocca, 2016; Lozano and Yaman, 2020; Opler, et al., 1999; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 




require the availability of resources. So, holding a safety-cushion, a sustainable buffer, to draw 
upon in case of economic downturns. To carefully monitor the level of liquidity of an enterprise, 
the financial statements represent the indispensable knowledge base, and the ratio analysis the 
appropriate tool to identify potential issues (Weetman, 2006). The most common ratios used, are: 
the Current ratio, the Quick ratio, the Net Working Capital to Total Assets ratio and the Cash ratio.  
The Current ratio is widely used for a prompt evaluation of a firm’s creditworthiness, it explains 
to which extent short-term assets are available to meet short-term liabilities. The principle behind 
this consists in the fact that a company can survive if able to meet the financial obligations as they 
fall due. The Quick ratio, also called Acid-test, is calculated by the rate of current assets net of 
inventory over the current liabilities. So, it provides a more illustrative indicator, especially during 
times of crisis. The Net Working Capital to Total Assets ratio points out the percentage of 
remaining liquid assets, net of current liabilities, and provides how much of the asset side is 
composed of net working capital. In relation to it, the time requested to transform corporate net 
working capital into cash is called the Working Capital Cycle, typically managed by an active 
inventory rotation, always trying to cash in quickly and extending deadlines as possible. As of last, 
the Cash ratio is calculated by the sum of cash and marketable securities over current liabilities, 
thus uniquely considering the most liquid assets of a company (Weetman, 2006).  
 
2. Fulfilling the liquidity shortages caused by the downturn 
Liquidity shortages arise whenever a financial institution or an industrial company scrambles for 
and cannot find the cash to meet the most urgent needs or to undertake valuable projects (Tirole, 
2008). Therefore, the liquidity risk is experienced every time a firm is not able to meet the expected 
payments and short-term obligations due to the incapacity of collecting new funds or liquidating 
its own assets on the market. Shocks occur whenever coordination failures happen among the 
economic players, and a reduction in confidence takes place. These are determined by a trigger 
variable, which may be internal or external to the corporate system. As extensively explained in 
the previous chapter, the Covid-19 outbreak represented a real shock that affected the overall 
economic system. To overcome the liquidity shortage at the firm level: selling assets, bring in 
additional revenues, and find any alternative ways to reduce the discrepancy between available 
cash and debt obligations, but also limiting the investment portfolio to strictly necessary operations, 




is what a firm must do (Bellini, 2020). Nevertheless, during periods of recession, the State can 
supply liquidity to companies issuing securities – backed by publicly owned assets, or through 
State-contingent injections (Tirole, 2008). In the new context shaped by the outbreak, the policies 
issued by the Governments were fundamental in determining the speed of recovery of the economic 
tissue and in finding the appropriate allocation of losses among the different economic agents 
(Gobbi, et al., 2020). The Italian Government has deployed substantial resources to ensure as far 
as possible business continuity for the companies, as follows the legislative measures enacted.  
 
Table 1 – The employment level and social policy responses 
“Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni” 
 Support wages to employees of all the sectors. 
Also for companies with less than 5 employees, if 
activity suspended or reduced due to Covid-19  
Several measures 
have been issued, 
balancing the support 
to the companies- to 
reduce the worsening 
of the margins, and to 
the workers – as 
support in income, 
jobs protection and 
rules for managing 
the transformed 
work-life balance.  
 
To lighten the 
corporate cost 
structure, some wage 
expenses have been 
frozen for those 
suffering from the 
reduction or the 
suspension of 
economic activities.  
 
Tax reductions 
assured to incentivize 
the efforts for 
ensuring safe 





citizens’ safety has 




If turnover up to € 50 million and relative loss of at 
least 33% in March and April 2020/2019 or 
revenues above € 50 million and loss of 50%: social 
security contributions suspended for April and May 
2020. For those who do not require the extension of 
the previous scheme extended for 4 months.  
In the case of new permanent contracts concluded, 
exclusion up to 6 months.  
Support for Southern 
Italy 
The 30% relief of pension contributions for the 
period October-December 2020. 
Dismissal Procedures 
Suspended unless the event of definitive cessation 
of the economic activities. 
Wage Subsidies To 
Prevent Layoffs 
Local authorities can help companies with 
personnel costs –for one year to prevent job losses. 
Not above 80% of gross monthly salary. 
Renewal Of Fixed Term 
Contracts 
Possible to renew or extend once even without 
reason and up to one year. 
Parental Leave Or 
Possibility of Smart 
Working 
Parental leave for parents employed in the private 
sector amounts to a total of 30 days - allowance of 
50% of salary.  
Or the right to work from home, even without an 
individual agreement. 
Assistance to Family 
Members “ex. Law 
104/92” 
In March and April – paid leave for additional 12 
days for assisting disabled family members.  
Tax Credit For 
Workplace Sanitisation 
And Safety 
The 60% for any expenses incurred to reopen safely 
to the public, up to € 80,000 for the beneficiary. In 
case of expenses for sanitisation of working place, 
up to €60,000 for the beneficiary. 
(Sources: “Cura Italia” n.18/2020; “Liquidità” n.23/2020; “Rilancio” n.34/2020; “Agosto” n.104/2020; “Ristori” 





Table 2 – One-off revenues and different forms of subsidies 
Tax Credit For 
Rent Payments 
If revenues up to €50 million, dropped by 50%: 60% 
of monthly rent payments for non-residential 
properties for March, April, and May.  
To foster the going 
concern of economic 
activities: some 
reductions in Treasury 
expenses and suspension 
for some operating costs. 
Also in this case, the 
actions are taken in 
order to mitigate the 
already suffering 
economic flow of the 
companies.  
 
Protection granted to the 
firms while carrying out 
projects of strategic 
importance, and non-
repayable contributions 
or facilitated conditions 
to sustain the investment 
activities – also relevant 
to deal with the crisis. 
IRAP Payment 
With turnover up to €250 million – cancelled the 
regional income tax  
Non-Repayable 
Grant 
If turnover up to €5 million and 
 decrease of at least 33%.  
Grant measured with respect to loss [10%-20%], 
minimum €2000  
Reduction in 
Energy Bills 
For SMEs fixed amounts reduced to guarantee this 
essential service 
“Nuova Sabatini” 
Subsidies to SMEs for investments in PP&E equal to 
interests calculated on a 5-year loan. 
Innovation 
Manager Voucher 
Non-repayable contribution to SMEs to make use of 
consulting and innovation services 
IPCEI Fund – 
refinanced 




Support to large-scale investments in industrial, 
tourism and environmental protection sectors. 
Through: non-repayable contribution facilitated 
financing or interest rate subsidies.  
(Sources: “Cura Italia” n.18/2020; “Liquidità” n.23/2020; “Rilancio” n.34/2020; “Agosto” n.104/2020; “Ristori” 
n.137/2020; “Ristori bis” n.149/2020; “Ristori ter” n.154/2020; “Ristori quater” n.157/2020) 
 
Table 3 – Measures dedicated to the equity replenishment 
Tax Credit 
For companies with a turnover between €5 million 
and €50 million: 20% for recapitalisation, 50% of 
capital losses exceeding the 10% of shareholders’ 
equity 
To avoid the erosion of 
capital due to the huge losses 
supported, some measures 
have been implemented to 
recapitalise. 
 
Trying to prevent that the 
drop in revenues leads to 
permanent effects. 
 
The occurrence of operating 
losses may alter the 
company's condition of 
economic equilibrium. 
Tax credits, facilitated 
conditions, funding dedicated 




For companies with a turnover between €5 million 
and €50 million: to subscribe to newly issued bonds 




For companies with a turnover above € 50 million, 
managed by CDP, to support recapitalisation of 
SPA registered in Italy or restructuring activities. 
Interventions preferably carried out through 
standardised procedures: signing convertible or 
subordinated loans. 
Considered: level of innovation, presence of critical 
and strategic infrastructure, strategic production 
chains, environmental sustainability, employment 
levels. 
(Sources: “Cura Italia” n.18/2020; “Liquidità” n.23/2020; “Rilancio” n.34/2020; “Agosto” n.104/2020; “Ristori” 





Table 4 – Measures implemented for the companies level of liquidity 
Debts Moratorium 
For SMEs, an extraordinary moratorium on 
overdraft facilities, financing for advances on debt 
instruments, maturities of short-term loans and 
instalments of loans and rents falling due. To 





To sustain companies in 
their operational liquidity 
needs, some huge 
interventions have been 
made. 
 
The payments of loans 
suspended to lighten the 




guarantees were offered to 
all the types of companies 
through convenient 
conditions, higher 
amounts of financing and 
with reduced credit 
assessment.  
“Garanzia Italia” - 
SACE 
For large enterprises, 6 years, pre-amortisation up 
to 3 years.  
Amount greater of 25% turnover and twice wage 
costs of 2019.  
Guarantees range inversely to the firm’s size 
[70%,90%]. 
Financing guarantees - in the case of SMEs and 
those with access to ISMEA guarantees - they must 
have exhausted the ceiling. Fees limited to cost 
recovery, cost must be lower than in guarantee’s 
absence.  
Lease guarantees 
for instrumental investments for business activity. 
Guarantee not greater than 20%. 
Guarantees for factoring 
Permitted on new financing transactions with or 
without the granting of an overdraft facility. No 
more than 20% guarantee, dedicated to liquidity for 
personnel costs, rents, company leases.  
Guarantees for debt securities 
for all the firms issuing bonds or other debt 
securities, registered in Italy, rating at least BB- and 
not in difficulty at the end of 2019.  
SACE Guarantee 
For Exports 
Co-insurance system: 90% by the State, 10% by the 
company to ensure strategic transactions.  
Insurance for trade receivables: 90% guarantee  
Guarantee Fund 
For SMEs 
Maximum amount granted up to €5 million, eligible 
criteria extended, operating features improved, 
coverage ratio increase. 
(Sources: “Cura Italia” n.18/2020; “Liquidità” n.23/2020; “Rilancio” n.34/2020; “Agosto” n.104/2020; “Ristori” 
n.137/2020; “Ristori bis” n.149/2020; “Ristori ter” n.154/2020; “Ristori quater” n.157/2020) 
 
With regards only to the fiscal measures, in relation to the additional expenditures during 2020, 
more than 80% were allocated to the Guarantee Fund for SMEs, for the “Gasparrini Fund”, the 
solidarity fund for first home mortgage, the budget was increased by €400 million and € 380 million 
were allocated to ISMEA to provide guarantees in favour of agricultural and fishing enterprises 






Figure 2 – The additional expenditure in 2020 for fiscal measures in Italy 
 
(Source: Dossier October 2020, Camera dei Deputati) 
 
Large programs of fiscal measures have been established by all the countries to fill liquidity 
shortages, finance the working capital, and support the necessary investments; self-employed 
workers, SMEs, and large companies were all supported to protect their professional activities, 
cover their working capital needs, and keep up the production (International Monetary Fund, 2020).  
 
In short, measures dedicated to providing liquidity at subsidized conditions for postponing and 
smoothing the impact of the Covid-19 crisis over a longer time horizon (Gobbi, et al., 2020). Fiscal 
responses can be distinguished in immediate fiscal responses, deferrals, and other provisions or 
credit guarantees (Camera dei Deputati,2020), these latter measured as a share of the 2019 GDP 
and updated to the end of November 2020, are shown as follows.  
 
 
First home mortgage 
solidarity fund; 5%
Guarantees on loans granted 
by the sports credit institute ; 
1%
Increase in the Guarantee 
Fund ; 83%
Fund to cover Public 
Guarantees ; 6%
First home guarantee 
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Table 5 – Fiscal responses in relation to 2019 GDP  
 Immediate fiscal 
responses 
Deferrals Other provisions 
and guarantees 
France 5.1% 8.7% 14.2% 
Spain 4.3% 0.4% 12.2% 
UK 8.3% 2.0% 15.4% 
Source: (Anderson, et al., 2020) 
 
Within the broad spectrum of possible institutional responses, the Public Loan Guarantee Schemes 
represented a key policy to support businesses, ensuring a sufficient supply of liquidity (Calice, 
2020). Indeed, in a situation characterized by high uncertainty, companies see loans as an 
instrument able to build up precautionary liquidity buffers and/or adapt the business (Anderson, et 
al., 2020), but difficult to obtain in case of loss in creditworthiness. The schemes are, in fact, aimed 
at transferring some of the credit risk and potential credit losses from banks to the Governments 
(Falagiarda, et al., 2020), so making the banking channel more prone to this type of intervention.  
De Blasio, (et al., 2018) observed that guaranteed loans in recent years have been representing a 
tool widely used to finance the working capital of companies, as capable of mitigating urgent 
liquidity requirements. Hence, also in this event, they have been chosen as a prominent policy to 
prevent businesses from becoming illiquid. Public credit guarantees aim to improve the access to 
credit for firms that do not have adequate collateral to participate in private credit markets because 
of asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Core and De 
Marco, 2020). 
This policy played an important role during the financial crises because of the provision of a higher 
degree of confidence in the financial system (Beck, et al., 2009). Since 1998, the European Union 
has guaranteed over €50 billion of loans, mainly to individual companies through multiannual 
financial programs (Brault and Signore, 2020). As follows, Table 6 will show the main features of 






Table 6 – Main features of the Public Guarantee Schemes implemented 
STATE GUARANTOR EXPOSURES 
COVERED 
TYPE OF THE 
LOAN 
COVERAGE RATE 






and others. Excluded: 
defaulted and insolvent 
obligors 
New lending and 
renewed in the 
case of extended 
term or increased 
amount 
80% for SMEs for 
large companies: 
70% new credit lines 
60% renewal 
France French State All companies excluded 
credit institutions, 
financing firms, certain 
real estate, defaulted 
companies at 31/12/19 





Germany KfW Commercial firms  New loans 80% -90% -100% 
depending on KfW 
Corona-Loan 





SMEs and other firms – 
three separate packages 
New loans 80% - 100% 
depending on the 
package  
(Sources: IMF Policy Tracker 2020 and OECD Country Policy Tracker 2020) 
 
This organized distribution of credit guarantees by a public institution aims at supporting 
undertakings not in financial difficulties at the end of the previous financial year and self-employed 
persons. The guarantees are mostly applied to new lending and typically on medium and long-term 
loans, with an average maturity of five years. The maximum amount is normally the greater 
between 25% of the beneficiary’s turnover of 2019 or twice the wage bill of the same financial 
year, as requested by the Temporary Framework (European Commission, 2020). The coverage 
ratio mainly varies between 70% and 90%, although 100% is available in few countries for SMEs 
and self-employed, at specific operational conditions. In some cases, few conditions have been 
imposed on the beneficiary enterprises, such as the prohibition to distribute dividends, limits on 
the remuneration of managers, or commitments to retain employees during the period of benefit of 
the scheme. One of the main reasons why this measure was applied by most of the affected 
countries is that it responds to the trade-off between responding quickly to the trigger event and 
maintaining an adequate level of prudence to mitigate undesirable banks’ behaviour or on the part 
of firms (Falagiarda, et al., 2020). 
 
The European Central Bank Economic Bulletin of June 2020 analysed the Public Guarantee 




and long-term loans have generally notably increased during 2020, as shown in Figure 3, in 
contrast to what normally happens when acute liquidity needs arise, that is a higher demand for 
short-term loans. Besides, substantial new lending flows have been recorded for small loans (below 
€1 million), especially in Spain, France, and Italy, in line with the take-up of guaranteed loans by 
SMEs and the convenient conditions applied in these countries (Falagiarda, et al., 2020). 
 
Figure 3 – Guaranteed loans to non-financial companies broken down by maturity  
 
Note: Pre-Covid-19” period ranges from March 2019 to February 2020 (Sources: ECB 2020) 
 
The Economic Bulletin explained that the great recourse to long-term guaranteed loans in Spain 
was primarily due to the restricted offer of alternative fiscal measures, such as debt moratorium or 
direct grants. While, in France, the high take-up, both on short-term and long-term maturity, 
reflects the favourable conditions offered by the public schemes. In Germany, the restricted use of 
credit follows the lower financing needs of firms compared with other countries, due to the less 
stringent lockdown measures imposed from April to July 2020 (the period considered in Figure 3), 
combined with the solid availability of alternative support measures. Lastly, in Italy, a low recourse 
was recorded since July 2020, mainly for the operational bottlenecks that initially existed on the 
supply side, such as the total amount of requests directed to long-term loans uniquely (Falagiarda, 
et al., 2020). 
 
In November 2020, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, published the 




project since 2008. The report is based on a sample of more than eleven thousand enterprises to 
describe the source of financing used in the European scenario; the reported version refers to the 
period from April to September 2020 (European Central Bank, November 2020). In the Euro Area, 
an increase of 20% in the demand for bank loans from SMEs was registered during the first period 
of the Covid-19 outbreak. The guaranteed loan financing was found as a primary tool for 
inventories and working capital needs, rather than for fixed investments. Furthermore, an 
improvement in the access to public financial support was registered, from -3% to +14%, for the 
first time since 2009 (European Central Bank, 2020). These results indicate that government 
initiatives to provide public guarantees for bank loans during the Covid-19 pandemic have fed 
through to these enterprises. Conversely, large and medium-sized enterprises conveyed a more 
negative view of the business environment influencing their access to external funds. Indeed, for 
48% of large enterprises and 41% of medium-sized companies, the economic outlook might have 
represented an impediment to access to external finance (European Central Bank, November 2020).  
 
The volume of credit guarantees pledged across European countries is significantly larger than 
what has been observed normally (Brault & Signore, 2020). However, the effectiveness of these 
schemes might vary in relation to industrial landscapes’ characteristics, the amount employed and 
the capacity of withstanding the potential future defaults of the guaranteed loans. Other relevant 
specificities about Credit Guarantee Schemes from the existing literature will be explained in the 
as following paragraphs. 
 
3.  The nature and Operationalizations of the Credit Guarantee Schemes  
Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) appeared in Europe for the first time during the 19th and early 
20th centuries (OECD, 2010 ). The first application took place in Holland in 1915, while in 1937 a 
regional State-run credit guarantee scheme was established in Tokyo, then followed by several 
countries promoting these schemes in the 1950s (Gozzi and Schmukler, 2016).  
The basic principle behind the scheme consists of third-party risk mitigation to lenders, with the 
object of increasing access to credit. If the third-party coincides precisely with the State itself, the 
measure becomes a Public Credit Guarantee Scheme (PCGS). The latter is an instrument enacted 
by the State to support companies’ access to bank credit through the provision of publicly funded 




to credit for certain subjects usually underserved by private financial intermediaries, as Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises, or companies new to the market.  
Currently, the Public Credit Guarantee Schemes amount to about $1.8 trillion worldwide, 
approximately 2.0% of the global GDP (Calice, 2020). A significant rise in popularity has been 
experienced during the past few decades, in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis; 
indeed, in that period, several Governments relied on this tool to offset the reduction in private 
bank lending (Gozzi & Schmukler, 2016).  
The target of the scheme is determined a priori: distinct sectors, regions, or specific categories, 
such as innovators or exporters, considering that choosing for a too specific target might increase 
the bureaucratic costs and limit the take-up (Green, 2003 ). In ordinary times, it is addressed to 
those unserved market segments to correct market failures, to overcome the obstacles to successful 
enterprises, and to fostering investment growth. As previously mentioned, the guarantee is 
provided by a third-party committed to repaying a share or the entire amount of the loan to the 
lender, in the case of the borrower’s default. So, through the guarantor, the risk faced by financial 
intermediaries is significantly reduced and the scheme acts as insurance (CervedKnow, 2020). 
In the event of public intervention in the scheme, it is usually caused by the coordination failure 
among private intermediaries and/or to the huge efforts that the first mover must support. The 
incurring costs, the underdeveloped financial system characterizing some players, and the relative 
high-risk judgment to those attributed, continuously arrest the private providers from pooling 
resources to some specific riskier segments. Thus, the public role becomes clearer (Mariani, et al., 
2013). Although rigorous evidence about the impact of public credit guarantee schemes, with 
respect to alternative instruments, is still scarce and the difficulty implied in a cost-benefit analysis, 
public credit guarantee schemes have been typically boosted or implemented ex novo, during 
periods of crisis (Gonzalez-Uribe & Wang, 2020). If existing schemes are enhanced, the 
improvement is done by increasing the funds available, extending the criteria for eligible 
applicants, in most of the cases contingent on the firm’s financial soundness before the crisis, and 
offering a greater coverage rate for higher loan sizes.  But what are the reasons behind this choice?  
The rationale can vary according to the view of the PCGS as a potential instrument to:  
▪ acquire information and experience about how to lend to a specific segment, 
▪ overcome information asymmetries, 




The first item explains that public guarantees could overcome the lack of incentives that normally 
characterize the financial intermediaries in the approach of a new segment of borrowers, due to the 
incurring costs involved in the learning process requested for additional lending relationships. 
Therefore, the scheme can address information problems, acting as a subsidy offered to cover the 
efforts sustained when a particular segment is approached for the first time (Gozzi & Schmukler, 
2016). So, the Government plays a crucial role in channelling private financial intermediaries 
towards new players, hence extending the receiver base (Green, 2003 ). In short, the public sector 
fosters innovation by the subsidization of the initial costs involved to reach a new group of firms 
(Gozzi and Schmukler, 2016).  
The second explanation for public intervention stands for the reduction in the principal-agent 
problem, that needs the Government to dispose of informational or enforcement advantage over 
the lenders, in order to be valid. In the case of informational advantages of the guarantor over the 
lender, the scheme can in fact facilitate filling informational asymmetries and reducing the costs 
of borrowing (Beck, et al., 2009 ). So, Public Credit Guarantees can help banks to overcome the 
information asymmetries improving the ability to make appropriate lending decisions (Levitsky, 
1997). In relation to this explanation, one opportunity consists in providing funds to mutual 
guarantee associations that hold close information about their members, but low capital to set-up 
the scheme on their own. In this case, the Government acts as a fund provider. Nevertheless, in the 
latter case, if not properly treated, a potentially negative effect could arise as the mutual guarantee 
association would be less incentivized to control as fewer own resources would be involved (Green, 
2003 ). 
Finally, the third motivation considers that State guarantees are called to boost private investment 
or lending to high risk or high-risk aversion (Gozzi & Schmukler, 2016). The Government has an 
intrinsic power of spreading risk across space and time, rather than players acting singularly. Credit 
guarantees may represent a mechanism able to transfer and diversify risk.  
 
4. Different typologies of Guarantee Schemes 
The Public Credit Guarantee Schemes represent the focus of the dissertation, but they do not 
represent the unique category of Credit Guarantee Schemes. The latter normally involves three 
parties which may be involved in a stable relationship: the borrower, the lender, and the guarantor; 




▪ The Mutual Guarantee Associations (MGAs) consist of a solidarity group composed of 
enterprises excluded from access to credit (Green, 2003 ). Thanks to the strict relationship 
occurring between the lenders and the borrowers, the level of asymmetric information is 
significantly reduced, thus improving lending decisions and relative costs. Normally, they are 
administered by a separate legal entity, members are firstly evaluated and then recommended 
to the lenders. The guarantees are financed through the capital of the mutual guarantee 
association, provided by the members themselves, and through a risk fund (Zecchini & Ventura, 
2007 ).  
▪ The Public Credit Guarantee Schemes represent most of the guarantee schemes worldwide, 
and they correspond to the case when a Development Agency, a Ministry, a publicly owned 
bank, or a separate Credit Institution run the guarantees (de Blasio, et al., 2018). Those are 
typically implemented to enact access to credit to unserved segments, to foster economic 
growth, or to protect the employment level.  
▪ The Corporate Guarantee Schemes are programmes managed by private players. In this case, 
building confidence for repayment abilities is clearly more difficult and less immediate (Green, 
2003 ), but the presence of a well-endowed fund can stimulate the generation of credibility.  
▪ The International Guarantee Schemes represent a form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
(Beck, et al., 2009 ). Funds and general assistance in designing and implementing the scheme 
are provided from different parties, and a local entity is needed to run the programme: it could 
be a financial institution, a private organization, a public institution, or a non-governmental 
organization.  
In all the cases briefly illustrated, the fund to implement the scheme might be composed of 
contributions from private owners, public sources, and donations (Calice, 2020). Even in the 
situation where a public Institution is not the main owner of the scheme, however, it plays a key 
role as it is responsible for the legislation behind, any possible tax waivers, and to monitor the 
proper functioning.  
 
5. The concept of financial and economic additionality and proper design of the scheme  
In the description of this measure, a crucial point should not be overlooked: whether the guarantee 




Scheme is not only sustainable, but also creates financial and economic additionality for the 
beneficiary (OECD, 2010).  
Public Credit Guarantees could represent an instrument through which obtaining better terms of 
borrowing and continuing the relationship with the lender, even after the public incentives run out. 
So, allowing beneficiaries to collect additional loans or portfolios of loans that would not have 
come about without the scheme or collecting at better conditions, thus granting financial 
additionality. Moreover, the concept of additionality can refer to an enlargement of the loan size, 
to a longer repayment period, a decrease in the interest rate, to lower collateral requests, or – again 
- to a more rapid procedure, resulting from the increase in the experience of the bank with the 
guaranteed borrowers (Green, 2003). Unless generating additional or enhanced loans, the analysis 
of economic additionality refers to the potential performance improvements induced by the scheme 
in the supported firms, such as developments in terms of growth, investment, employment, new 
products developed, productivity, or innovation (Beck, et al., 2009 ). Whereas, when dealing with 
a period of crisis, the improvement can uniquely be determined by the possibility of overcoming 
the shock.  
 
Additionality is not easy to prove, given the numbers of variables under discussion. For instance, 
when financial additionality is investigated, some bias could be generated by the lenders who might 
substitute guaranteed loans for other loans and borrowers who might switch across lenders from 
unguaranteed to guaranteed loans (Gozzi & Schmukler, 2016). However, in any case, guarantees 
allow loans to be made to segments of borrowers that otherwise would have been excluded from 
the lending market, permitting them the establishment of a repayment reputation that in the future 
can act as collateral (OECD, 2010). In conclusion, to achieve a form of additionality for a 
Guarantee Scheme three main conditions must be considered: a learning process for the lenders 
about the creditworthiness of borrowers, an increase in the institutional capacity of lending to 
normally underserved businesses, and finally an increased competition due to new profitable 
segments accessing (Green, 2003).  
 
The success and financial viability of Credit Guarantee Schemes rely heavily on appropriate design 
choices: the management structure, the regulation behind, the coverage ratios; they all have direct 
effects on the outcome effectiveness (Honoan, 2010). For instance, a coverage rate smaller than 




in fact would be more encouraged to scrupulously screen the loans covered. Otherwise, the 
incorrect design of the scheme may also imply side effects, such as incentives for excessive 
indebtedness or imprudent risk allocation, consequently requiring necessary close monitoring 
(Falagiarda, et al., 2020). Even if the structure of the scheme requests to be tailored for each 
situation, identifying good practices is essential to clearly define the objectives of the scheme. So, 
good practices that might drive to success, and hopefully ensure both sustainability and 
additionality, are described as follows.  
 
Table 7 – The organizational and operational issues of Guarantee Schemes 
 
Funding Establish a fund from public or private sources to 
obtain the amount needed to ensure viability. 
Enough capital to permit effective launch and 
subsequent activity, potential voluntary private 
contributions 
Administration Skilled and prepared representatives of borrowers 
and lenders in the management of the Scheme 
Targeting Determination of specific segments based on their 
size-location-industry-access to finance. So, 
establishing a selective approach for potential 
beneficiaries  
Risk Distribution The risk is distributed and shared among the 
parties  
Types of measure offered The max loan size and limits on exposure set. 
Guarantees for working capital, investment, or 
leasing 
Monitoring Clear division of responsibilities; it is important 
that CG could meet certain minimum legal 
conditions to profile as a credit risk mitigation 
technique  
Regulatory and  
Institutional Framework 
The need for a credible institution or program is 
easily scaled up or adapted, or - if not existed -, 
creating a guarantee fund, or managed by a private 
entity  
Fees  Application of fees to ensure economic feasibility 
adapted to the risk  
Additional services Potential outsourcing to third parties, banks-staff 
training, or consulting for borrowers 
(Modelled by the author following A. Green (2003) and P. Calice (2020)) 
 
▪ Funding: the financing requested to run the scheme can be collected uniquely through public 




sources. The different sources might be diverse in giving lenders the proper incentives to avoid 
excessive risk-taking, and thus minimizing the potential loan losses (Beck, et al., 2009 ). 
▪ Administration: in the management of the scheme, skilled and prepared representatives of 
borrowers and lenders can encourage success (Green, 2003 ). The presence of a plateau of 
people with the right competencies to assess and approve the applications, control their 
functioning, collect information, review the claims, and just in case, pursue defaulting 
borrowers is needed.  
▪ Targeting: represents the segment to which the measure is specifically oriented; it can be 
identified in the size of the company, the geographic area, the industry, or the specific sector, 
and for instance, in relation to the grade of access to finance. Therefore, resulting in benefit for 
specific unserved groups of economic players (Levitsky, 1997). 
▪ Risk Distribution: in case of a scheme inadequately designed, moral hazard can arise and 
increase among the parties. For this reason, proper design and implementation are crucial to 
divide the risk of loss among lenders, borrowers, and guarantors. For instance, in the case of a 
100% guarantee, the banks’ incentives to assess and monitor risk are reduced, and so greater 
moral hazard might arise (Beck, et al., 2009 ). While, below a certain threshold, the potentiality 
of moral hazard can be reduced, however reducing the banks’ incentives to participate in the 
scheme. For instance, a guarantee coverage smaller than 50% is insufficient to induce banks to 
participate since overall costs will remain too high (Green, 2003 ). Therefore, the point consists 
in finding the well-balanced percentage which ensures the right trade-off between incentives to 
assess and monitor the risk and to participate in the fund. Avoiding moral hazard for borrowers 
means ensuring their partly supply of collateral (Zecchini & Ventura, 2007 ).  
▪ Types of measures offered: an individual approach or a portfolio approach for loans can be 
followed. In the first case, applications to the scheme are approved directly by the guarantor 
and the assessment is done individually, permitting more careful risk management, and 
reducing the probability of moral hazard (Lapachi & Ormotsadze, 2012). In the second case, a 
less accurate screening process is done, and the guarantor negotiates only the eligibility criteria 
for the portfolio: targeted to particular company size, to a particular location or a specific sector, 
or other characteristics.   
▪ Monitoring: whether the lender or the guarantor who performs this function depends on the 
operational structure. In the case of the portfolio approach, screening and approval are entirely 




requested. Some well-defined eligibility criteria and standardised appraisal procedures help in 
facilitating this function. No matter which approach is adopted, a clear division of responsibility 
between guarantor and lender in approving applications and monitoring borrowers, is always 
requested. Generally, the players which select the borrowers assume most of the risk. The basic 
principle behind this is that guarantee schemes are not aimed at providing finance for projects 
of doubtful viability, even if this is not always ensured. The rejection rate represents how many 
applications have been refused after the request. Although it is certainly advisable to reject 
some unjustified or too risky applications, overly conservative approvals could weaken the 
ability to create additionality (Green, 2003 ).  
▪ Regulatory and Institutional Framework: a well-regulated scheme contributes directly to its 
level of credibility and so to the banking sector’s confidence towards the measure. The 
institutional framework helps for the reduction of obstacles to the creation, promotion, and 
growth of the scheme. It regards the establishment of minimum capital requirements, an 
appropriate insolvency ratio and transparency criteria (OECD, 2010 ), the level of control, the 
maximum duration of the measure. In fact, a critical point consists of the fact that guarantee 
schemes could be used as substitutes for structural reforms, as the first-best solution to the 
problem (Green, 2003 ) not always followed by any actions with a longer-term perspective.   
▪ Fees: to ensure economic feasibility, commissions to be charged represent an important design 
aspect that impacts the entire financial sustainability of the fund. The incentives to participate 
for lenders and borrowers directly depend on the level of fees. Thus, the crucial point is finding 
the right balance in the commissions required: high enough to cover the administrative costs 
but reduced to ensure an adequate level of participation (Lapachi & Ormotsadze, 2012). The 
percentages established and how fees are applied vary among the schemes: in some cases, there 
is a registration fee, to deter not justified applications and an annual fee. Otherwise, a per-loan 
fee. The amount can be established either on the amount of the guarantee or on the underlying 
loan. Accordingly to a World Bank study, subsequently explained in more detail, only 15% of 
the schemes impose a membership fee, 30% an annual fee and finally 48% a per-loan fee. Fees 
signal that the guarantee and the services provided have a value and they inform of the fact that 
the scheme is operating at market conditions. Commissions on outstanding guarantee schemes 
are typically around 2% per annum (Green, 2003). Under the portfolio approach, the 
implementation requires less administrative work from the guarantor, so the fees should be 




typologies of costs can be distinguished in running the scheme: the set-up costs, the costs of 
funding and the additional costs incurred by the financial system to run and participate in the 
program (Levitsky, 1997). 
▪ Additional services can be offered such as training for the bank’s employees or consulting 
activities for the borrowers, trying to reach the most viable management of the scheme. Besides 
providing guarantees for loans, additional services might consist in several aspects such as 
project appraisals, business plans, accounting, management, and marketing training. Given the 
greater value offered through the services, an additional commission should be charged for 
their use. In most cases, the supplementary assistance is provided at more advantageous prices 
compared to the market offers (Green, 2003 ). The perspective about technical assistance may 
be significant for lenders and borrowers during the initial choice. Finally, attention should be 
put on the right balance between the two proposals, since offering several services requires 
resources: decreasing the quality of the guarantee scheme in favour of supplementary services 
should be avoided.    
The grade of the leverage ratio has an impact on the overall sustainability of the scheme. It refers 
to the share of outstanding guarantees over the total size of the guarantee fund (Green, 2003 ): a 
high rate can contribute or threaten sustainability, depending on how many borrowers will default 
and, on the commissions collected. Potential economies of scale in terms of fixed costs can be 
reached, but a maximum threshold of leverage should be specified depending on the ability of 
managing operations.  
 
During 2008, as previously mentioned, the World Bank structured a survey on forty-six countries 
to see how the structure of Public Credit Guarantee Schemes could vary around the world (Beck, 
et al., 2009). It was found that many of the schemes were created for specific goals and with detailed 
specifications in terms of sector-type or geographic area. Particularly, 45% of the schemes 
implemented were addressed to SMEs. In terms of the type of measure offered: only 14% of the 
schemes were founded to use a portfolio method, instead of an individual approach. The median 
coverage rate was 80%; such a value is able to encourage lender participation and low enough to 
limit moral hazard (OECD, 2010 ). A marked separation between governmental or private sector 
administration was discovered: the role of the Government was mostly linked to the funding side 




risk assessment by private parties can improve the quality of risk decisions and minimize loan 
losses, while the recovery is made by the lenders, rather than the Government, is facilitated due to 
the more information available about the borrower and potentially stronger incentives to recover 
the loans (Beck, et al., 2009).  
 
In conclusion, Public Credit Guarantee Schemes can help companies to handle liquidity crises, but 
their role should not be overemphasized (Calice, 2020). Since these measures are carried out, some 
advantages and disadvantages became evident. Firstly, they require low budgetary implications, at 
least before credit losses materialize, since a large volume of loans can be guaranteed with a 
comparatively small capital base (Gozzi & Schmukler, 2016), and whenever they are already in 
place, the request for quick deployment. Furthermore, public guarantees seem to be more effective 
and less costly in expanding access to external finance than directed lending, and the schemes help 
to diversify risks across lenders in different sectors and geographical areas (Beck, et al., 2009 ). 
While, at the same time, they are a first-moment intervention that requests complementary policies 
and investments to sustain the long-term recovery. This might be the case if additional injections 
of liquidity turn into higher levels of debts and potential future capital erosion. During the crisis, 
the intervention corresponds to a replacement of revenues with debts, making the firm risk growing. 
Another crucial point is developing adequate incentives to ensure that, once private financial 
intermediaries understand how to deal with new players, the relation can continue even without 
further subsidies. Clearly, terminating the schemes prematurely may risk precipitating severe 
liquidity squeezes for firms and triggering bankruptcies (Falagiarda, et al., 2020). Finally, another 
critical issue must be considered in the evaluation of this measure: if the policy support provided 
were to lead to a permanent expansion of the role of Government in driving economic outcomes, 
it may hamper allocative efficiency and reduce the productive capacity of the economy over a 
longer horizon, keeping afloat firms not viable or sufficiently profitable (Falagiarda, et al., 2020).  
 
Once the Public Credit Guarantee Schemes have been explained from a theoretical point of view 
and through some data about their application in countries other than Italy, also describing the basic 
concepts about their design and implementation, the next two chapters will describe the specific 
case of the Guarantee Fund for SMEs in Italy during the Covid-19 crisis. Furthermore, the response 






The State-backed Guarantee Fund for SMEs in Italy  
 
1. The operational changes applied  
European Institutions have been quick to anticipate the key role of banks and of the other financial 
intermediaries in coping with the effects of the outbreak and in fostering the credit flow to the 
economy. All Member States should be able to enact measures to encourage credit institutions and 
financial agents to continue their role of support to the economic activities (Camera dei Deputati, 
December 2020). Particular attention was reserved to the segment of economic players which 
probably could have suffered the most from the situation. So, a series of instruments and facilities 
have been dedicated to them, also in derogation of the State Aids rules of the European 
Commission. In the Italian scenario, a scheme for extraordinary and transitional guarantees on bank 
loans to enterprises, centred on the role of SACE S.p.A. and the Guarantee Fund for SMEs was 
enacted. Among the various facilities, the extension of the Central Guarantee Fund functionality 
certainly played a major role. 
On the 14th of April 2020, the Aid Scheme authorized the enhancement of the guarantee 
intervention through the Fund, and a further authorisation, after the conversion into law, came on 
the 16th of June 2020. The Guarantee Fund for SMEs is an instrument which has operated in Italy 
in the past twenty years, firstly established by Article 2, comma 100 – letter a) of Law No. 662/96 
and Article 15 of Law 266/97. The fund is managed by Mediocredito Centrale, a banking institution 
fully owned by Invitalia, which in turn is owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The 
Art. 2, comma 100 – letter a) of the Law “Misure di razionalizzazione della finanza pubblica” 
states: “Within the resources referred to in paragraph 99, the CIPE may allocate a) an amount up 
to a maximum of 400 billion lire for the financing of a guarantee fund set up at Mediocredito 
Centrale SpA to ensure partial insurance for credits granted by credit institutions to small and 
medium-sized enterprises”. The public resources mentioned refer to those which may be used by 
the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) for the implementation of public 
investments to finance immediately executable projects, even for purposes other than those 
envisaged by the respective legislation. While Article 15 “Razionalizzazione dei fondi pubblici di 
garanzia”, states that in addition to the resources mentioned, others were allocated by subsequent 




and financial companies for innovation and development in relation to loans to small and medium-
sized enterprises. Furthermore, the criteria and modalities to operate and manage the fund, as well 
as the possible reserves of funds for specific sectors or types of operations are regulated directly 
by the Ministry.  
As the crisis started, the first Decree “Cura Italia” immediately ensured more lean and fast 
procedures, quick response times, enlarged the eligibility and allocated funds in its favour. In short, 
strengthening and extension of the Fund’s intervention took place. Through the “Fondo di Garanzia 
per PMI” the European Union and the Italian Government support companies and professionals 
who normally have difficulties in accessing bank credit, so public guarantees substantially replace 
the guarantees requested to obtain the financing. In the section of the Fund about the “Operational 
Modalities”, the requirements and conditions to access the guarantee are defined, as well as the 
management procedures for the financial operations benefiting from the guarantee. Nevertheless, 
the instrument is intended for different categories of economic subjects.  
 
Those who are eligible:  
▪ SMEs registered in the Italian Business Register, including artisan enterprises,  
▪ professionals registered with professional bodies or members of professional associations,  
▪ consortia and consortium companies.  
Furthermore, in accordance with the “Liquidity Decree” the eligible beneficiaries have been 
extended to:  
▪ third sector entities, including recognised religious entities, 
▪ professionals organized in associated offices,  
▪ insurance agents and subagents, and brokers.  
▪ companies with up to 499 employees.   
The measure is destined to firms operating in all the sectors, except the financial, but including 
brokers, insurance agents and subagents, as just mentioned covered by the extension.  
In accordance with Movimprese Report, due to the Chambers of Commerce, the sole proprietorship 
in Italy at 2020 amounts to 3,131,611, while the corporations amount to 1,791,853; therefore the 
extended eligible criteria significantly increase the scope of the scheme. In addition, the agricultural 
businesses can utilize the re-insurance scheme approaching a Confidi, which is operating in the 




to the Guarantee Fund, as the bank itself - whenever converges in the financing request -, will take 
care of it. The beneficiary applies for the guarantee and the financing concurrently, or it can refer 
first to an accredited Confidi which guarantees and then the counter-guarantee will be supplied by 
the Fund. Whereas normally the firm needs to file a standard loan application, the bank has to 
verify the eligibility through a scoring system and then the firm has to do another application 
directly to the Fund. All those three steps have been removed for loans up to €30,000. The 
classification of the type of operation on which the guarantee can be requested is in the section of 
“Operational Provisions” of the Fund. In relation to that, the intervention is granted on all kind of 
operations, aimed at both short and medium-long term business activities, designed to inject 
liquidity or to permit investment activity and the guarantee can be granted through a direct 
guarantee, or reinsurance, or a counter-guarantee, or jointly on the same financial transaction. 
Moreover, it is relevant to note that the fund does not intervene directly in the bank-client 
relationship, since the interest rates and repayment conditions are left to the negotiations between 
the parties. The concession is typically joined to collaterals brought by the firms or sometimes 
totally substituting them, sometimes the fund can guarantee some amounts without further 
commitments by the enterprises. 
 
The economic crisis brought significant changes to the Guarantee Fund for SMEs, in the first 
instance through the “Cura Italia” Decree and then through the “Liquidity Decree” and the “August 
Decree”. The Government has indeed modified the instrument to deal with the economic shock 
and protect those most at risk. The Liquidity Decree introduced important innovations:  
▪ the intervention is free of charge (without the payment of commissions),  
▪ the maximum guaranteed amount per firm is raised from €2.5 million up to €5.0 million,  
▪ mid-cap companies with up to 499 employees are also eligible for guarantees,  
▪ guarantee is allowed also in case of renegotiation of existing loans (80% direct guarantee and 
90% in case of reinsurance), provided that the new financing provides at least 10% of the 
outstanding debt. (25% according to Decree-Law 23/2020),  
▪ automatic extension of the guarantee for loans suspended due to the occurrence of Covid-19, 
suspension for the amortisation rates or the capital amount payments,  
▪ guarantee for loans up to €30,000 granted without the assessment of the beneficiary: no 
application of the credit assessment model, but companies with exposures classified as non-




▪ the Fund only approves the applications submitted by banks, Confidi and other financial 
intermediaries after the verification about the applicants’ eligibility and that they do not exceed 
the prescribed aid limits,  
▪ fees for failure to complete the transactions submitted are cancelled,  
▪ guarantee for short-term loans for individuals whose professional, artistic activities are 
damaged are admitted free of charge and without assessment for an amount up to €3,000 (80% 
direct guarantee and 90% in case of reinsurance), 
▪ guarantee also in favour of entities reported in “Centrale dei Rischi” as "likely to default" and 
with operations classified as "past due" or "impaired overdrawn" after the 31st of January 2020, 
▪ guarantee granted also to companies admitted to the arrangement procedure of arrangement 
with business continuity, or entered into restructuring agreements after the end of 2019, 
▪ the interest rate for 100% guarantees is determined through a weighted average of government 
bond yields plus the spread with sovereign 5-year CDS spreads, with a cap set at 2%; for not 
fully guaranteed loans, the interest rate is at the bank’s choice,  
▪ possibility of cumulating the guarantee with other forms of guarantee for operations of more 
than €500,000 and a minimum duration of 10 years, in the tourism and real estate sectors, 
▪ increase in the coverage percentages for individual loans included in the portfolios and for the 
total amount of the portfolio (as shown in Table 6),  
▪ the guarantee may be cumulated with an additional guarantee of up to 100% coverage for 
beneficiaries with turnover not exceeding €3.2 million.  
 
Furthermore, in addition to the extraordinary and transitional measures, the “Liquidity Decree” 
intervened on the functioning of the Guarantee Fund for SMEs structurally, stipulating:  
▪ in some regions, an anticipation of the cessation date for the limited intervention including 
uniquely the possibility of counter-guarantees, 
▪ the permission for contributions from private parties, not only from banks, regions, and other 
public entities,  
▪ the resources for issuing guarantees on portfolios of loans and portfolio of minibonds come 
from the part residual to the one dedicated to loans on individual transactions,  
▪ for companies that access the scheme, when the anti-mafia documentation is not immediately 




▪ an 80% guarantee for microcredit operators, free of charge and the maximum amount for 
microcredit operations increased to €40,000.  
The modifications presented are into force since the 31st of December 2020. Now, the new 
framework which has been created by the enhanced operability, in terms of increased coverage 
rates, extended guarantee duration, and a greater amount of financing is outlined:  
 






100%  Both direct guarantee 
and reinsurance 
New financing amount 
of the loan up to 30,000 
euros (before it was 
25,000) 
The maximum term of 
repayment is ten years, 
provided it does not 






Both direct guarantee 
and reinsurance 
For any financing up to 
800,000 euros, you can 
combine with Confidi   
Maximum term of loan 
repayment is six years, 
to obtain a total 
guarantee: +10% from 
Confidi can be 
combined 
80% for direct 
guarantee 
 
90% for reinsurance 
Both direct guarantee 
and reinsurance 
For all procedures not 
listed above, with a 
maximum secured 
amount of five million  
To obtain a total 
guarantee: the fund 
+20% from Confidi can 
be combined 
(Created following Fondo di Garanzia website) 
 
In all the cases, the amount of the financing may not exceed 25% of the beneficiary’s revenues 
during the last financial year or twice the wage bill of the same period, as regulated by the 
Temporary Framework of the European Commission. While, for beneficiary companies 
established after the 1st of January 2019, it must be demonstrated through appropriate 
documentation. The investigations are simplified: the company self-certifies its data and tax 
loyalty. Also, it is worthy to underline that the coverage ratio is the maximum envisaged by the 
European regulation (European Commission, 2020). The various decrees issued allocated different 
packages of resources, in particular: €1.7M by Liquidity Decree, €3.9M by the “Relaunch Decree” 
and €7.3M by the “August Decree” for the three-year period from 2023 to 2025, respectively: 




special sections of the Italian Guarantee Fund dedicated to specific sectors or geographic areas and 
sometimes some portion of resources have been allocated to some objectives. For instance, among 
those allocated during the Covid-19 crisis, an amount up to €100 million, is earmarked for 
guarantees on loans to non-commercial entities, including third sector entities and civilly 
recognized religious entities. Other extensions in terms of operability are shown by the fact that 
the guarantee may also be requested on financial transactions already finalised and disbursed, no 
more than three months after the date of submission, after the 31st of January of 2020 and that the 
eligibility criteria were extended also to persons carrying out activities corresponding to the section 
K of the Ateco Code and Start-ups. For the latter, the necessity of presenting the Business Plan and 
the provisional budget does not exist no more. 
 
2. The Special Section in accordance with Article 56 of “Cura Italia” Decree  
On October 5th, through the Circular 18/2020, the Special Section set up in accordance with Article 
56 of the “Cura Italia” Decree, came into force. The section operates in favour of businesses and 
professionals who benefited from the measures provided by the article: prohibition of revocation 
for revocable credit facilities and loans against credit advances, an extension of loans, and 
suspension of instalments on mortgages and other loans repayable by instalments. In fact, Article 
56, then modified by Article 65 of the “August Decree”, provides for the companies which suffered 
from the Covid-19 crisis, the possibility of obtaining one of the following: 
▪ Prohibition of revocation: for revocable credit lines and loans granted against advances on 
credits existing on the 29th of February 2020, the amounts granted, both for the part used and 
for the one not used, cannot be revoked at the date of termination, neither totally nor partially, 
▪ Extension: for loans with contractual maturity before the date of termination of the measures, 
the contracts are extended, under the same conditions until the date,  
▪ Suspension: for mortgages and other loans repayable by instalments, including those made by 
issuing agricultural bills, the payment of instalments or leasing instalments falling due before 
the date of termination of the measures is suspended and the repayment schedule is drawn up 
in such a way to ensure no new or increased charges for both parties.  
For these kinds of measures, SMEs and professionals operating in Italy and any sector, which 




have to present impaired exposures at the date of publication of the Decree. The Special Section 
guarantees:  
▪ for 33% of the higher utilisations, at the date of termination of the measures, compared to the 
amount utilised at the date of publication of the Decree,  
▪ for 33% of loans and another financing whose maturity is extended,  
▪ for 33% also for the suspended individual loan payments, another financing repayable by 
instalments or of leasing instalments.  
For obtaining the subsidiary guarantee of 33% no creditworthiness assessment is requested, the 
provision is free of charges, but the Section’s intervention concerns solely the financial transactions 
not already covered by the guarantees of the Fund. The August Decree introduced the extension 
for the measures of the prohibition of revocation, extension, and suspension of the existing loans 
until the 31st of January 2021 (31st of March 2021, for the companies belonging to the tourism 
sector). Considering the above, it is specified the "Date of the end of the measures", indicated in 
the Operational Modalities of the Section. 
 
3. The application to “Fondo di Garanzia per PMI” during the Covid-19 period  
In accordance with the act of Data Transparency for Public Administration, according to the 
Legislative Decree no. 33 of the 14th of March 2013, the data regarding the total access to Guarantee 
Fund for SMEs shall be made public. The database presented on the website of the Fund provides 
the information collected at the loan level with the relative amount of financing and the type of 
process through which the guarantee has been released. The specific profile of the beneficiary is 
made available together with the tax identification number. Other variables presented, and publicly 
accessible are:  
▪ the type of intervention,  
▪ the maximum guaranteed amount,  
▪ the type of operation,  
▪ the specific reserve or Special section,  
▪ the date of approval,  
▪ the amount of financing,  
▪ the region and province of use, related to the beneficiary,  




Henceforth, a descriptive analysis of the activity of the Fund during the crisis period will be done 
through the data collected up to the 1st of December 2020. So, results will be presented for the 
period between January 2020 and the first days of December.  
 
The total number of procedures activated sums up to 675,765, while the economic agents who 
benefit were 536,235, since some of them requested guarantees more than once. In comparison 
with 2019, where the procedures were 121,940 and the economic agents who benefited 33,881, the 
number of guarantees issued in 2020 was more than five times the ones in 2019 (Fondo di Garanzia, 
2019). Within the last two figures, not only small and medium enterprises are considered but also 
the newly eligible players such as professionals, third sector organisations, bigger companies, and 
assurance agents. Among the information released, the type of intervention refers to which type of 
measure the client asks for: the company or the professional can apply to a bank for financing and 
concurrently request a direct guarantee on it. Otherwise, the applicant can turn to an accredited 
Confidi, which guarantees in the first instance and then requires a counter- guarantee to the Fund.  
 
During 2020, in most of the cases, a direct guarantee was provided, specifically the 96.11%, 
through 649,502 requests. That is in line with the great intervention of guarantees for loans up to 
€30,000, due to the extremely favourable conditions of this measure of full coverage, such as the 
absence of creditworthiness enhancement and of any charges. Conversely, the counter-guarantee 
issued was 3.89% with 26,263 requests. Different coverage ratios are related to the two measures: 
in the sample analysed, in the case of counter-guarantee, 76% of the financing is covered on 
average, while in case of direct guarantee it is covered for 86%, on average. 
 
The amount of financing clearly represents the volume of the loan for which the guarantee has been 
established. This quantity has been distinguished in three specific tranches to which a coverage 
ratio is attached. Loans up to €30,000, up to €800,000 or greater than €800,000, in the third tranche. 
In our sample, the average size of the loan guaranteed is €116,698.  
 
As shown in Table 9, Lombardia, Veneto, and Emilia Romagna were the Italian regions receiving 






Table 9 – The amount guaranteed, by Regions 
 
(Source: Fondo di Garanzia database) 
 
Furthermore, gathering the data from Movimprese, the report about companies in Italy written by 
the Chambers of Commerce, we extract the total number of registered firms, distinguished by 
region, on the 31st of December 2020 and obtain the table below: 
 
Table 10 – The Regional uptake during 2020 
 











The maximum guaranteed amount depends on the coverage ratio and so it is directly linked to the 
previous figure. Therefore, if the graph above would have been made based on the maximum 
amount guaranteed, it had probably show up very close to the latter. The total maximum amount 
guaranteed during the given period amounts to about €9 billion. In our analysis, the maximum 
guaranteed amount reached €5,000,000, as envisaged by the new Guarantee Fund, which enlarges 
the maximum amount per firm from €2.5 million up to €5 million.  
More specifically, for a counter-guarantee the maximum amount reached is €3,600,000, while for 
the direct guarantee it is €5,000,000, as expected. The information about the type of operation states 
whether it refers to a risk capital operation, or a condition of duration not less than 36 months, to 
a quasi-equity investment or an underwriting transaction mini bond. Up to the 1st of December 
2020, 99.9% of the cases correspond to “Other financial operation”, with no other additional 
information.  
 
The Guarantee Fund, as previously explained, counts for different sections and reserves, 
corresponding to which different targets are encountered, different conditions must be respected, 
and different resources have normally been allocated. The Special Section established on the 5th of 
October 2020, has been highly relevant since the date of implementation. Indeed, looking at the 
data, the different sections to which guarantees account for amount to seventeen, and the two most 
relevant correspond to the Guarantee Fund itself and, in the second instance, to the Section in 
accordance with Article 56 of the Cura Italia Decree. The 96.65% of the total amount of guarantees 
refer directly to the Fund, whereas the 2.49% refer to the newly created “Sez. Art.56 DL Cura 
Italia”. The portion could be so restricted, as the measure has been implemented in the last three 
months, while for the other sections’ percentages they are so small so not representing any 
significant portion. Considering the type of intervention: 93.2% of the total counter-guarantee have 
been granted through the section of the Guarantee Fund; nonetheless, the counter-guarantees 
correspond just to 3.7% of operations made through the “Fondo di Garanzia” Section. This shows 
how little use has been made of the counter- guarantee. Whereas, considering the direct guarantees, 
96.8% of them have been made through the Guarantee Fund.  
Concerning the date of approval, our sample ranges from the 8th of January 2020 to the 1st of 
December 2020, presenting all operations admitted to the Guarantee Fund at the loan level. Table 





Table 11 – The time distribution of the interventions 
 
(Source: Fondo di Garanzia database) 
 
As shown in Table 11, the peak of guarantees took place between May and July 2020, with a short 
decline in August, before growing again in September 2020.  
 
Table 12 – The cumulative number of guarantees 
 
(Source: Fondo di Garanzia database) 
 
In the first period of implementation, the timeframe necessary to accept applications was affected 
by a large number of requests and by the time of adaptation to the new procedures, whilst in May 
























two not affected by the crisis), a small number of guarantees has been released. To ensure efficient 
and quick management of the measures, enacted to grant liquidity to the companies, a task force 
was set up by the Bank of Italy, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Economic 
Development, the Italian Banking Association, Mediocredito Centrale, and SACE (Banca d'Italia, 
May 2020).  
 
Considering the type of process through which the guarantee is approved and provided, it might 
vary with respect to different categories. 
 
Table 13 – The type of process 
Decreto Legge 8th of April 2020, Art.13 
Lett. M 
452,294 → 66.93% 
Modello di rating 183,845 →  27.21% 
Decreto Legge 17th of Marh 2020, Art. 56 16,813 
Importo ridotto 8,630 
Portafoglio 1,552 
Resto al Sud 517 
Microcredito 426 
Start-up contabilita ordinaria 5,896 
Start-up contabilita semplificata 401 
Start-up SGA 3,711 
Start-up Innovative 1,132 
Tripartito 548 
(Source: Fondo di Garanzia database) 
 
The two cases worth mentioning are those corresponding to the highest shares. In accordance with 
the new type of process enabled during the period of the Covid-19 crisis, the most widely used 
categories are:  
▪ the Decreto Legge 8th of April 2020 Art.13 Lett. M, for the 69.15%,  




In the first case, it refers to all the conditions previously explained as introduced by the Decree in 
April 2020. It refers to the provision of guarantees by the Fund with a 100% coverage ratio for both 
direct guarantees and reinsurance, eligible for new loans to SMEs and professionals whose business 
activity has been damaged by the COVID-19 emergency. While in the second case, the rating 
model refers to the calculation of the probability of default of the beneficiaries putting them into 
several classes describing the rating scale. In addition to these results, some general regulatory 
criteria must be considered. The model of assessment is based on an economic and financial module 
with information about any presence of judgmental events. The result defines the final class of 
merit. On this basis, both the eligibility and coverage ratio for guarantees are determined. Normally, 
under certain conditions, innovative start-ups and incubators are eligible without the assessment 
and the same for other types of operation characterized by small amounts of financing.  The third 
most used type of process is the one related to the Article 56 of the Cura Italia Decree, in relation 
with the specific Special section.  
 
In the overall amount of loans, 488,150 were up to €30,000, representing the 72% of the guaranteed 
loans, whilst in 187,615 cases the portion of loans was greater than €30,000. This result is due to 
the very favourable conditions, such as the lack of assessment, the enlargement of the potential 
beneficiaries, the speed through which the loan is disbursed, without waiting for the Fund's 
response. The operational modality to request for this kind of loan is the “Allegato 4 bis, ex Legge 
di conversion of Decreto Legge 8th of April 2020”. So far, the fundamental intervention of the 
Guarantee Fund during the Covid-19 crisis period has been outlined, but further analysis requires 
an understanding of the major variables influencing the specific company requests, for this type of 






Companies’ response to the Guarantee Scheme  
 
1. Sample definition  
After a general overview about the changes to the Guarantee Fund for SMEs and the relative 
participation during the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic, a deeper analysis is conducted to 
understand if a sort of local effect or sectoral effect is embedded in the choice of applying for a 
public guarantee. Moreover, in case of adoption, the amount of the loan guaranteed versus some 
company-specific features will be assessed. 
The investigation will be done matching the unique tax code of the borrowers who benefited from 
the Fund with the tax code of the private companies whose financial accounts of the last year have 
been collected. The financial statements of 2019 of Italian private firms have been collected 
through Aida, a database belonging to Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive information 
about private companies in Italy, with up to ten years of history. The dataset being used is made of 
the companies with Financial Statements closed on the 31st of December 2019, and not in financial 
difficulties at the time. The data were gathered in six different tranches, from May to November 
2020, to update the collection step by step, in accordance with the scattered publication of the 
balance sheets, due to the extension of the approval period during the downturn. 
The guaranteed financing has been collected at the loan level, up to the 1st of December 2020 and, 
since the same beneficiary may apply more than once until reaching the maximum loan amount 
guaranteed, the dataset contains duplicate information. Specifically, it counts for 139,530 
duplicates, representing the second or third requests of some specific borrower. To consider only 
the real number of beneficiaries, duplicates will obviously be excluded, as shown in Figure 4. 
Through the provision of the unique tax code, the merge with company-specific data is possible. 
On the other side, the collection of financial accounts of the Italian private firms amounts to 
617,169 observations, hence only 577,803 of them were eligible to apply to the Guarantee Fund, 
since they are companies with employees up to 499 and sales up to €50 million, in accordance with 
the new criteria of eligibility. Without the current modification, eligible companies would only be 
SMEs, i.e. with up to 250 employees. 
Finally, the merge between the two “cleaned” databases, among the eligible players, only 198,723 




regression analysis – as they do not obtain any guaranteed loan, despite probably being eligible. 
Therefore, in our sample, only 34.4 % of the total eligible economic agents have participated in the 
Fund. Thus, showing a lower level than expected, given the convenience and immediacy of the 
measure. Nevertheless, this last result is in line with the findings of Core & De Marco (2020), 
analysing the Guarantee Fund’s adoption during the period of Covid-19. 
Over the 536,235 actors who benefited from the fund (“without double requests” in Figure 4), the 
information contained in our dataset refers to only 208,417 of them, showing the probability of 
having a relevant share of third sector entities, listed companies, associations or self-employed.  
 
Figure 4 – Sampling procedure  
 
(Sources: Aida and Fondo di Garanzia) 
 
The focus of the study are small and medium enterprises, with extended eligibility criteria in terms 
of employees, up to 499. These categories, to which normally the scheme of public guarantees is 
dedicated, seem to benefit the most from Public Loan Guarantees (Angelino, et al., 2020). Their 
higher take-up registered at European level may reflect the greater liquidity needs and their direct 
dependence on bank financing during the downturn (Falagiarda, et al., 2020). To better understand 
the habitual conduct of the companies to which the guarantees have been released, with respect to 
the just mentioned reliance on bank financing, their precedent recourse to bank credit has been 
investigated. The presence of financial charges in the last balance sheet available has been taken 
into account as a signal. It was found that among all the eligible companies, both taking advantage 















Whereas looking only to those which adopted the public guarantees, only the 5% of them did not 
have recourse to the banking credit market during the last year of 2019, thus showing that the 
companies benefiting from the scheme were, mostly, already used to resorting to the banking 
channel. 
 
Which companies have benefited most from public guarantees?  
With reference to the business structure, the prevailing legal form within the beneficiary enterprises 
is the “limited liability company”, which amounts to 77% of the sample considered of the 198,723 
beneficiaries, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 - Legal form of the companies who receive guaranteed loans  
 
(Sources: Aida and Fondo di Garanzia) 
 
Therefore, if the distinction is made in terms of industrial sector, wholesale trade and retail trade 
have been those categories benefiting the most from the public scheme, as reported in Table 8. The 
classification, made with respect to the 2-digits ATECO code, highlights that the restauration 
sector, together with the construction industry are the next two categories in the ranking of 
applicants for guarantees. These findings can be explained by the fact that restaurants were the first 
economic activity to be closed and the ones that remained closed the longest, while construction is 
a sector characterised by the need for large capital expenditure and by a long-term vision, in 
Limited Liability 
Consortium













contrast with the uncertainty characterizing the crisis times. So, the resilience of both the categories 
has been severely tested by the pandemic. Conversely, in our sample, the sectors characterized by 
smaller participation rates are the textile industries, leather goods manufacturing, wood industry, 
or the national press industry. 
 
Table 14 – 2-digit ATECO sectors of the companies obtaining the guarantees 
 
(Numbers reported correspond to the Ateco Code – Sources: Aida and Fondo di Garanzia) 
 
2. Variables description 
Since the Scheme presents large differences in the take-up rate across geographic and sectoral 
areas, being still a lot of room for application (the enterprises which were subjected to lockdown 
but did not require for Public Guarantees are 221,744 in our sample), the following analysis aims 
at understanding what characteristics matter the most in the choice of applying. In particular, the 
“location effect” or “industry effect” will be assessed, analysing the firm-level evidence. Several 
variables will be considered in running the regression to explain those factors. The drivers 
considered might be divided into external and internal variables, whether they refer to some 
Wholesale Trade : 46
Retail Trade : 47
Restaurant Activity : 56
Specialised Construction Work : 43
Construction of Buildings : 41
Manufacture of Metal Products : 25
Real Estate Activities : 68
Trade and repair of vehicles : 45
Land transport : 49
Accommodation : 55
Manufacture of machinery and equipment : 28
Food industries : 10
Software production and Consultancy : 62
Business management and consulting : 70
Business support activities : 82




macroeconomic aspects about the Italian scenario during the Covid-19 crisis or to some firm-
specific features. 
 
The shutdown of the economic activities  
Firstly, it has been considered whether the enterprise belongs to one of the ATECO codes which 
have been shut down by the decree enacted on the 25th of March 2020, and so whether the company 
corresponds to an essential or non-essential sector. The identification has become more and more 
crucial to follow the several regulations enacted during the entire year through the several decrees. 
On the 25th of March 2020, all the economic activities considered as non-essential were requested 
to close and stop the production. Such a severe restriction did not occur any longer during the 
pandemic (at least so far). In our sample, 63% of the enterprises which granted public guarantees 
were subject to lockdown at that time.  
 
Table 15 – The shutdown of economic activities that received Public Guarantees: 
 
(Source: Aida Database) 
 
Covid-19 Incidence Rate 
Thanks to the information daily collected by Protezione Civile, the Institution charged with the 
coordination of policies and activities in the field of defence and civil protection, the incidence rate 
distinguished for provinces has been calculated. Specifically, the share of positive cases in each 
Italian province on three different dates have been extrapolated to derive the local impact of the 
pandemic. The time thresholds chosen are the 31st of May, the 30th of September, and the 1st of 
December 2020, as three different stages which can be considered as crucial in the distinction of 







compared to the total provincial population obtained from the National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT). Thus associating the area in which the firm is located to the highest incidence rate 
measured among the three different points in time, the specific incidence rate to be considered is 
matched.  
 
Application to the Redundancy Fund  
Among the factors, the recourse to the Redundancy Fund has been taken into consideration. 
Specifically, the data of the average share of employees who have made use of the fund, 
distinguished by ATECO code, have been taken from the National Institute for Social Security 
(INPS). This variable has been considered to understand if the uptake to the two separate public 
schemes could be related. Table 16 shows the average percentages of employees making use of the 
Redundancy Fund, and how widespread these data are in our sample. In most of the cases, the 
average percentage are high (70% of the companies belong to sectors where the average percentage 
of employees on lay-off is above 30%, in our sample). While 86% of the companies take part in 
sectors where the average percentage is above 20%.  
 
Table 16 – Industry breakdown to the Redundancy Fund 
 
 (Source: Aida Database and INPS)  
























































Drop in revenues 
During the year 2020, almost all the companies and industries have been subjected to a significant 
drop in revenues, especially in some sectors and for different periods of time. Thanks to the greater 
availability of data that characterises them, and their degree of update, the drop in revenues has 
been inferred through a sample of listed firms located in the same European countries considered 
in the First Chapter analysis. The results have been associated with the unlisted companies for 
which real data about 2019 are at disposal.  
 
Drop in the cost structure  
With respect to the cost structure necessary to run the activity, a distinction between fixed costs 
and variable costs must be considered. Given the speed of the spread and the relative immediate 
measures for closures, the possibility of preventing the costs from being incurred, especially in the 
case of fixed costs, was impossible for companies. Indeed, fixed costs remain constant, unless some 
relief or postponement, while some of the variable costs were able to be suspended, but most of the 
time not as quick as required. The same procedure as for revenues was followed for the collection 
procedure, thus the result has been associated with the level of firm-elasticity measured historically. 
 
Uptake to the Guarantee Fund during the financial year 2019  
The account was taken of whether the company benefited from the Guarantee Fund during the 
previous year, clearly at different operative conditions, and with restricted eligibility criteria. The 
information has been collected by the database publicly available (Fondo di Garanzia, 2019).  
 
Amount of financing  
The amount of financing can reach the total amount of €5 million/company, according to the new 
regulations. Subsequently, the amount of financing will be used to distinguish the fully and partially 
guarantee granted in the analysis. The amount of financing corresponds to specific conditions and 
the relative coverage ratio. But what determines the amount of financing? That is what will be 
analysed through our second regression. Furthermore, its correlation with the Incidence Share of 
Covid-19 amounts to 0.046, while with Equity2019 to 0.37. The correlation between the Amount 
of Financing and the Total Assets is 0.52, showing what might appear to be a relevant relationship, 





Internal Variables  
The variables referring to the financial accounts of the company express the liquidity status, the 
capitalisation, and the size of the company in relation to the end of 2019. For all of them, the data 
considered are those belonging to the financial year of 2019. Net working capital on total assets, 
Cash Flow generation, Total Debt are all used to understand the previous liquidity status of the 
company and its debt behaviour. Furthermore, the Equity level and the Total assets to differentiate 
in terms of size and capitalisation, have been considered.  
 
3. Development of hypotheses and model estimation 
As a first step, we want to test if any geographical effect or industry effect is influencing the 
adoption of the Public Guarantee. 
So we will investigate if the belonging to a given sector eventually been locked - down due to the 
Decree -, and/or being in a certain province for which a higher or lower incidence rate has been 
measured, matter to explain the uptake in the 2020 Guarantee Program. Common sense would lead 
us to think positively, therefore, the analysis wants to prove two main hypotheses: 
 
i.a Being a firm in a non-essential sector positively affects the probability of adoption 
the public guarantee of the Fund. 
 
ii.a Being a firm located in a province with a higher infection rate positively affects the 
probability of adopting the public guarantee of the Fund. 
 
Those two hypotheses will be tested through the determination of a null hypothesis: 
 
H0i: β₁, which expresses the effect of being in a non-essential sector, is not statistically different 
from zero 
H0ii: β₂, which expresses the variation experienced when operating in a province with a higher 
infection rate, is not statistically different from zero 
 
A linear regression, at the firm level, will be conducted in relation to “Guarantee”, a dummy 






Secondly, we will try to better understand the relation between the amount of financing covered by 
the Guarantee Programme and both the geographical and industry effects, just discussed, 
considering the specific features of the company. The following hypothesis will also be discussed: 
 
i.b Taken for granted the uptake to the Fund, being a firm in a non-essential sector, 
positively affects the amount of financing requested.  
ii.b Being a firm located in a province with a higher infection rate positively affects the 
amount of financing requested. 
iii.b The worse the decline in Ebitda 2020, the more the amount of financing required 
increases.  
 
These will be tested through the determination of a null hypothesis: 
 
H0i: β₁, which expresses the effect of being in a non-essential sector, is not statistically different 
from zero 
H0ii: β₂, which expresses the variation experienced when operating in a province with higher 
infection rate, is not statistically different from zero 
H0ii: β₄, which expresses the effect of Ebitda variation on the amount of financing, is not 
statistically different from zero 
 
The following regression will be run: 
 
Financing=α+β₁Lockdown+β₂CovShare+β₃CIG+ β₄DropEbitda + β₅NWCTA+ β₆Debt+  
 +β₇CF+β₈Equity+β₉Guarantee19 
 
4. Discussion of the results 
Since the “Guarantee 2020 Uptake” is a dummy variable that expresses if a firm has adopted the 




the OLS model would lead to biased parameters, as the main assumptions of the model would not 
be respected. So, a logistic regression model, a particular form of linear regression, has been applied 
through the Stata Software. In particular, a Probit Model ensures that the predicted probabilities 
will be between 0 and 1 and through an interference process analogous to that of the OLS model. 
In that case, the coefficients obtained are not directly interpretable as marginal effects, nevertheless, 
through Stata, the actual marginal effects are obtained, as reported in Table 18.  
Table 17 shows the Regression results allowing the investigation of the direction of the variables’ 
relationships. 
 
Table 17 – First regression 
Guarantee 2020 Uptake 
 
Lockdown 0.09*** 
  (0.004) 
Covid Share -2.32*** 
  (0.18) 
Use of CIG 0.59*** 
  (0.017) 
Size 0.068*** 
  (0.00) 
Drop Revenues -1.99*** 
  (0.026) 
Drop COG 2.03*** 
  (0.03) 
NWCTA 0.12*** 
  (0.007) 
Intercept -1.04*** 
  (0.01)  
 
N. Observations 421,354 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0242 
    
(Notes: Standard error in parentheses. Statistically significant at 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***) 
 
All the coefficients tested through the test z result as statistically significant at 1% level, so rejecting 
the null hypotheses and the Pseudo R-Squared, which expresses the goodness of fit of the model, 






Table 18 – The marginal effects 
Guarantee 2020 Uptake  
Lockdown 0.03*** 
   
Covid Share -0.86*** 
   
Use of CIG 0.218*** 
   
Size 0.025*** 
   
Drop Revenues -0.73*** 
   
Drop COG 0.75*** 
   
NWCTA 0.045*** 
   
Intercept 0.38*** 
   
(Notes: Statistically significant at 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***) 
 
From the analysis of the coefficients resulting from the regression, two variables were found to be 
negatively correlated to the Guarantee Uptake: the incidence of cases at the provincial level (Covid-
Share) and the percentage reduction in revenues. Therefore, the first hypothesis (i.a) has been 
confirmed, for which a firm belonging to a non-essential sector positively affects the probability 
of adopting a public guarantee. In particular, belonging to a non-essential increase by 3% the 
probability of accessing public guaranteed credit.  
While the second (ii. a): “Being located in an area more affected by the virus positively affects the 
probability of accessing the Fund” was refused. The same controversial result has been found by 
the analysis conducted by Core & De Marco (2020). This result might be interpreted since the 
period in which the analysis is conducted ranges from the first moments of the spread to those 
where the pandemic was characterized by boundless effects. Thus, this wide period of time may 
have meant that the real effects recorded in the early months of the scheme - where we would have 
expected the higher infection rate to lead to greater participation in the fund - were lost. Moreover, 
the last result regarding the first months of the outbreak could be confirmed by looking at the 
distribution of guarantees among Italian regions, the timeline followed, and a differentiated 
regression considering the three periods separately. In fact, through a highly conservative analysis 
by which the respective observations collected during the period between March and June 2020 
were matched with the incidence rate at the province level, the Covid-19 Share resulted positively 




affected areas. Furthermore, considering a company that belongs to a sector where - on average - 
the employees are using the extraordinary Redundancy Scheme at a given percentage, the 
probability of benefiting from the Public Guarantee increases by 0.21% for a unit increase in the 
share of employees applying, for each company. With regards to the relation between the firm 
dimension and the probability of accessing the Fund: a 1% increase in the size of the company 
boosts the probability of 2.5%. Lastly, for a greater share of net working capital on total assets, the 
probability of adopting a public guarantee increases, as a tool to make possible the disposal of 
liquidity to cover the operating activities. Examining the company economic flow, as common 
sense suggests, an increase in the drop incurred at the level of cost or revenue structures has a 
relevant direct effect on the probability of participation in the Programme: positive and negative, 
respectively. This latter finding is confirmed by the evidence for which short-term loans are 
typically used to fulfil operational needs (Gozzi & Schmukler, 2016).  
For the sake of completeness, as the operational conditions widely change in the case of Fully or 
Partially guaranteed loans, the same regression has been applied, separately for the two cases.  
 
Table 19 – First regression with distinctions for coverage ratios 
Guarantee 2020 Uptake Fully Partially 
Lockdown 0.11*** 0.06*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
Covid Share -2.24*** -1.96*** 
  (0.21) (0.26) 
Use of CIG 0.61*** 0.48*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Size -0.07*** 0.28*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Drop Revenues -1.72*** -2.05*** 
  (0.029) (0.037) 
Drop COG 1.67*** 2.22*** 
  (0.03) (0.042) 
NWCTA 0.11*** 0.12*** 
  (0.008) (0.01) 
Intercept -0.53*** -3.05*** 
  (0.012) (0.017) 
N. Observations 360,742 322,460 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0253 0.1303 





Table 20 – The marginal effects 
Guarantee 2020  Fully Partially 
Lockdown 0.034*** 0.016*** 
    
Covid Share -0.72*** -0.45*** 
    
Use of CIG 0.19*** 0.11*** 
    
Size -0.02*** 0.064*** 
    
Drop Revenues 0.55*** -0.47*** 
    
Drop COG 0.54*** 0.52*** 
    
NWCTA 0.034*** 0.028*** 
    
Intercept 0.27*** 0.18*** 
    
(Notes: Statistically significant at 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***)  
 
Being a Probit Model, the second table shows the real marginal effects. The results obtained with 
regards to the first (i. a) and the second hypothesis (ii. a) coincide with the previous findings. In 
this case, the overall fit of the model is greater for both the specifications, in particular for Partially 
guaranteed loans, demonstrating that the control variables explained more in these cases.  
 
Considering our sample, 66% of the total loans guaranteed are fully covered. The latter seems to 
present the probability of adopting – in this case -, the full covered loans, more affected by the 
condition of being shut down or not, by the incidence rate registered and by the industry-level of 
recourse to “Cassa Integrazione Straordinaria”, as the magnitude of the effects is greater. With 
regards to the Net Working Capital share and the drop registered in revenues and costs, the scenario 
is likely the same for both cases. With respect to the size: being a larger enterprise decreases the 
likelihood of applying for a full guarantee. This finding might be explained by the operating 
conditions of the Fund: the full coverage is granted for small loans and not to all the firms, even if 
the eligibility criteria have been extended. In Table 21, the average firm characteristics experienced 







Table 21 – Average characteristics of firms obtaining fully and partial coverage 
 
(Source: Aida Database) 
Table 21 shows that on average asking for a Fully or a Partially Guarantee is highly affected by the 
company’s size – as shown by the differentiation in “Total Assets”, result also confirmed by the 
regression. Furthermore, a clear diversification is drawn by the liquidity ratios: “Cash Flow”, 
“Short Term Debts”, “Short Term Credits” and “Net Working Capital”. Nonetheless, for the latter 
a less relevant diversification was found by the regression. 
 
The second regression is aimed at studying the effective amount guaranteed by the Fund. In this 
case, the linear regression is run through the OLS method as the dependent variable “(amount of 
financing/ total-assets)/1000” is continuous. Thereby, the coefficients obtained represent the true 
marginal effects and R-Squared expresses the goodness of fit of the model. The level of R-Squared 
is quite good: approximately 40% of the variance of the model is explained. 
 
All the coefficients tested through the t-test result as statistically significant at 1% level, so rejecting 
the null hypotheses. Considering the two first hypotheses (i. b and ii. b) concerning those tested by 
the first regression, the model confirms only the second one (ii. b). Therefore, a company that 
belongs to the non-essential sector when ompared to one in the essential sector, will require a 0.2% 

















were not closed. While a company located in an area more affected by the virus will request a 
0.75% higher amount of financing. Considering the uptake to the Redundancy Scheme or the 
uptake to the Guarantee Fund by the firm during 2019, in the first case, an increase in the average 
rate of employees participating decreases the amount of financing requested, while the amount 
covered by the Fund is 0.28% higher for a firm which adopted the Public Guarantee also during 
the last year. 
 






















(Notes: Standard error in parentheses. Statistically significant at 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***) 
 
Examining the company-specific features, starting from the relationship with the firms’ capital at 
the end of 2019, the previously calculated correlation between the amount of financing and the 
equity level amounts to 0.37; the regression then confirms the relationship between the two 
Amount of Financing (1) 
Lockdown -2.14*** 
  (0.22) 
Covid Share 75.1*** 
  (9.7) 
Use of CIG -5.04*** 
  (0.8) 
Drop EBITDA -2.29*** 
  (0.15) 
NWCTA 0.045*** 
  (0.00) 
Total Debt -0.001*** 
  (0.00) 
Cash Flow 0.01*** 
  (0.00) 
Equity 0.004*** 
  (0.00) 
Guarantee2019 2.88*** 
  (0.31) 
Intercept 13.4*** 
 (0.42)   






variables as positive. While, considering the Net Working Capital and the Cash Flow, the 
regression shows that they are positively related to the amount of financing, but as the amounts 
reflect the liquidity situation in 2019 which has been strongly disrupted by the shock in 2020, it is 
convenient to consider a more updated data. Therefore, we considered the drop in EBITDA in 
2020, as, given the numerous measures of relief in terms of taxes, depreciation, and amortisation, 
it can be considered as a good flow indicator at the company level. The model confirms what the 
(iii. b) hypothesis assumes, the worse the decline in EBITDA 2020, the more the amount of 
financing required increases, particularly by the 2.3%. Moreover, the size of the company has been 
considered scaling the dependent variable for the total amount of assets registered during the last 
financial year available (2019). Since, as previously mentioned, the financing guaranteed was 
found as a primary tool used for inventories and working capital needs, in periods of crisis (De 
Blasio et al., 2018; European Central Bank, 2020), the result in terms of EBITDA is strictly in line. 
The financing operates as a safety cushion during the period of downturn. 
Lastly, the regression shows that as the total debt position increases, the amount of financing 
decreases by 0.0001%. Generally speaking, with large debt positions the tendency emerges to avoid 
further tightening during the uncertain period. In relation, Zecchini & Ventura (2007) showed that 
there exists a causal relationship between the public guarantee and the higher debt leverage of 
guaranteed firms. 
 
5. Potential issues and limitations  
Amongst the different limitations which may be attributed to the analysis performed is the fact that 
the model uniquely considers the demand side, without looking at what the supply side is. The 
latter corresponds to the pool of banks which collect the requests and provide the financing. 
Therefore, the lever through which aid is provided and the instrument throughout which 
Government-backed liquidity is furnished to the companies. Moreover, the economic actor most 
challenged by the modifications applied to the Guarantee Fund as the necessity of a solid 
Information Technology Infrastructure and consideration in terms of convenience became 
essential. Hence, considering which banking intermediaries actually acted for the profusion of the 
public guarantees could have been an added value to have a clearer vision of the functioning of the 





Secondly, another gap might be found in the lack of historical series, considering the previous use 
of Public Guarantees by the companies, and not only the uptake rate during the previous year may 
add relevant highlights. Thus, the absence of comparison with the variables which in normal times 
are more determinant for the uptake to the Guarantee Fund. So, this represents a limitation, but 
given the substantial operative amendments applied to the Scheme during the year, the comparison 
might have turned out to be quite biased. For this reason, a more consistent insertion could have 
been a comparison with the role of the Guarantee Fund during the Global Financial Crisis. A 
distinct situation which however may help to compare what resources were deployed at the time 
and to what extent certain variables did favour the adoption of the guarantee at that time.  
 
Lastly, a relevant issue characterizing the research is related to the financial data on which the 
analysis is built: they are the financial accounts of private firms corresponding to the last year 
available, 2019 and the relative estimations for the variations incurred in 2020 are inferred from a 
sample of listed firms. So the analysis is made on forecasts, rather than real values. This was clearly 
the only way forward, so an actual and non-preliminary estimate of the most influential variables 
in responding to the enlarged Guarantee Fund will have to wait for company data updated to 2020. 








Public Credit Guarantee Schemes represent an instrument widely used to finance the working 
capital needs of the enterprises and to support them when facing liquidity shortages (Brault & 
Signore, 2020; Calice, 2020; De Blasio, et al.,2018, Tirole, 2008; Zecchini & Ventura, 2007). In 
the Institutional Framework established by the Italian Government in response to the Covid-19 
crisis, the 22% of GDP has been allocated for broadening the supply of public guarantees at 
favourable conditions (Camera dei Deputati, October 2020). In view of this context, the work was 
dedicated to understanding the actual response of Italian companies to this intervention and to 
preliminary analyse what has most influenced the adoption, with the aim of understanding whether 
it is possible to outline a common pattern of guarantee allocation among private Italian companies. 
 
The research has shown that the procedures activated for guarantees issued up to the 1st of 
December 2020 have been five times those of 2019. In absolute terms, three main regions benefited 
the most from the Guarantee Fund for SMEs: Lombardia, Veneto, and Emilia Romagna. Whereas 
in relative terms, considering the data about regional business structure in the Annual Report of 
Movimprese (2020), Veneto, Toscana and Marche were the areas more served. Generally, the 
average adoption amounted to 12% per region. On the other hand, in relation to the time 
distribution, the 70% of applications were devolved between May and July 2020, with a subsequent 
decrease in August and a slight recovery starting from September 2020. The restricted functionality 
reported up to the month of May 2020, might be due to operational bottlenecks due to a large 
number of applications and the relative inability of the banking system to manage them or more 
generally to adapt to the new conditions of the Scheme.  
According to the data collected from the Guarantee Fund, the financial accounts of Italian private 
companies not in financial difficulty on the 31st of December 2019 have been merged. The 
subclassification in terms of size has been done since only the companies eligible to the Fund were 
considered, specifically the SMEs and the companies with up to 499 employees and sales up to 
€50 million. In our sample, the adoption was measured at 34.4%, showing a low participation rate 
compared to the expected one, given the convenience and immediacy of the intervention. This may 




insurance agents, to whom the public guarantees have been extended and which are not contained 
in our sample.  
So, which firms benefited from the Programme? The 95% of those applying to the Guarantee Fund 
were Limited Liability Companies, and the Retail Trade and Wholesale Trade were the industry 
sectors which benefited the most. Then followed by the Restaurant and the Construction sectors. 
The latter by definition is characterized by large capital expenditure requirements, therefore 
suffering from the high uncertainty of the crisis, while the former was highly affected by the 
governmental containment measures. As for Zecchini & Ventura (2007) which analysed PCGs 
interventions in normal times, the economic sectors benefiting the most were non-innovative 
activities or industries which do not involve a relevant level of innovation or technology 
infrastructure. Furthermore, in our sample, only the 5% of the beneficiary companies did not 
recourse to bank credit during the 2019, meaning that almost all of them were used to resorting to 
banking channels. 
 
The data collected outlined a diversified distribution relative to different sectors and areas, so the 
focus of the analysis moved to what can be called a “geographical effect” or a “sector effect”. 
Crucial to understanding, given the low level of participation reported and in light of the presence 
of room for application: the 38% of our sample corresponds to companies subject to lockdown 
which did not require any guarantees. Considering the sectoral effect, the 63% of the firms granting 
from the public intervention were subject to lockdown, moreover, for most of the non-essential 
activities, the stores were closed for delimited periods of time during the second wave, again 
leading to a drop in demand. For a company, being part of a non-essential sector positively affected 
the probability of adopting a public guarantee, in particular, it increases by 3% the probability of 
accessing the Guarantee Fund. However, regarding the level of contagion registered at Province 
level, through the data collected from the Protezione Civile (2020), it was found that being located 
in an area more affected by the virus did not increase the probability of accessing the Fund, 
conversely to what our common sense would lead us to believe. This controversial result was 
confirmed also by Core & De Marco (2020) in their research. Probably, the fact that the analysis 
was conducted from the starting period of the outbreak to a phase where the effects became 
boundless, may have affected the results obtained. Indeed, through a highly conservative analysis, 
it was found that between March and May 2020, the incidence rate was positively related to the 





With consideration of the Redundancy Scheme, among the companies adopting the public 
guarantees, the 70% belongs to sectors where the average of employees on layoff was about the 
30%, showing quite parallel participation to the two interventions. For an increase in the average 
share of employees on lay off in the sector where the company operates, the probability of uptake 
increases by the 1%. Considering the firm-specific characteristics, in relation to the challenged 
economic flow, both the drop in revenues and costs have a relevant effect on the participation to 
the Fund: a negative and positive relation, respectively. While, as the size of the company increases, 
the probability of access increases by 2.5%. 
 
In our sample, the average amount of financing amounts to €116, 698 and the portion of requests 
up to €30,000 corresponds to 72% of the sample. Showing that in the case of amount of financing 
greater than €30,000, the one granting of full coverage and for which the conditions are particularly 
advantageous, all the other financing guaranteed were large amounts. Furthermore, the financing 
have been distinguished in “Fully guaranteed” or “Partially guaranteed” in order to understand if 
some significant diversifications were measured, and in the case of full guarantees, the companies 
resulted to be more affected by being or not shut down, by the incidence rate measured at Province 
level and also by the participation to the Redundancy Scheme. Conversely, being a larger company 
decreased the likelihood of applying for a full guarantee, which could be explained by the operating 
conditions, since 100% guarantee is offered to smaller loans.  
 
And finally, what determined the amount of financing? A company subject to lockdown resulted 
to be more likely to participate, but requiring for a 0.2% lower amount of financing, demonstrating 
that greater amounts have been requested by companies not closed by the Government Decree. 
Whereas a company belonging to an area characterized by a higher incidence rate did not result in 
being more likely to participate, but – in case of adoption of the public guarantee, – as the incidence 
rate increases, it will require a 0.75% higher amount of financing. Having benefited from the 
Guarantee Fund for SMEs during 2019, at different operational conditions, increased the amount 
of financing in 2020 by the 0.28%. With regards to the registered EBITDA in 2020, clearly based 
on an estimate: as it decreases, as the amount of financing increases by 2.3%.  
Therefore, according to our findings, to benefit from a public guarantee of the Guarantee Fund for 




lower incidence rate and with an increased industry-average of employees applying for layoffs, 
increases the likelihood of participating to the Fund. While once participated, the amount of 
financing increases for a company located in an area more affected by the virus, experiencing a 
greater reduction in EBITDA 2020 and which already applied for a Public Guarantee in 2019.  
 
Since the analysis conducted represents a preliminary study, is there scope for future research? 
In addition to the limitations described above, which may become a future research scenario, 
analysing the Public Guarantees offered to deal with the Covid-19 outside the national territory 
might be interesting, in order to compare the main effective variables involved in the companies’ 
response. Indeed, the economic landscape appears to shape the impact of credit guarantees (Brault 
& Signore, 2020). Furthermore, in future periods of time, investigating the permanence of the 
relationship, even without subsidies. Moreover, investigating what will be the default distribution, 
since businesses are now struggling even more for the second and third waves of contagion and the 
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